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INTRODUCTION
Algorithms are everywhere on the rise. In a wide range of domains, from screening resumes1 to determining criminal justice outcomes,2 automated decision-making using advanced prediction technologies and big data has replaced human decision-making.
Consumer credit, too, relies increasingly on machine learning algorithms3 and nontraditional data.4
These technologies have improved efficiency and accuracy. But
they have also generated concern about bias.5 Bias, a term used to
1. See Josh Bersin, Big Data in Human Resources: Talent Analytics (People Analytics)
Comes
of
Age,
FORBES
(Feb.
17,
2013),
http://www
.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2013/02/17/bigdata-in-human-resources
-talent-analytics-comes-of-age [https://perma.cc/FN3H-BMQS]; Matt Richtel, How
Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/technology/how-big-data-is-playing
-recruiter-for-specialized-workers.html [https://perma.cc/3RAJ-AP9H].
2. See Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes than Random People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2018/01/equivant-compas-algorithm/550646
[https://perma.cc/JBG2
-NZV9].
3. See infra Part II.A.3.
4. See infra Part II.A.1; see also 84 C.F.R. § 32420 (2019) (describing the recent
Fair Lending Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), released
on June 28, 2019 and a symposium the Bureau held in which participants “discussed
the role alternative data and modeling techniques can play in expanding access to
traditional credit”).
5. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677 (2016); Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of
Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 25–29 (2018); Mikella
Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH.
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describe unfairness to a vulnerable population or legally protected
group,6 can occur in algorithms for several reasons. It can result from
training an algorithm with nonrepresentative data,7 from predicting
a human decision that is biased,8 or from imperfectly measuring the
outcome of interest.9 One particular source of concern is that we
might be using characteristics or “inputs” that are biased. This con148, 168 (2016); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 857, 874 (2016); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2233,
2251 (2019); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 402 (2018); see
also Megan Smith, DJ Patil & Cecilia Muñoz, Big Risks, Big Opportunities: The Intersection of Big Data and Civil Rights, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (May 4, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/04/big-risks-big
-opportunities-intersection-big-data-and-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/2866-4LVN].
6. See Mayson, supra note 5, at 2231 (discussing the ambiguity of the term “bias”). Often the language used to define “bias” is quite circular. See, e.g., Kim, supra
note 5, at 887 (“Similarly, data mining models built using biased, error-ridden, or unrepresentative data may be statistically biased.”).
7. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 178 (“If credit scorers rely on nonneutral data collection tools that fail to capture a representative sample of all groups,
some groups could ultimately be treated less favorably or ignored by the scorer’s final model.”). It could also be that the dataset is simply flawed. For example, the Federal Trade Commission found that 21% of its sample of consumers had a confirmed
error on at least one of three credit bureau reports. See Report to Congress Under Section 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, FED. TRADE COMM’N
iv (Dec. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/section
-319-fair-and-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federal-trade
-commission/130211factareport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2VB-PLM3]. This is of particular concern if certain groups, such as racial minorities, are more likely to have
errors in their files. This is likely what happened when Amazon used AI to recruit
workers, given that past hiring was predominantly male. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon
Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/
amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women
-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/T4NT-WUUD].
8. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 5, at 26 (discussing an example in which an
algorithm was set up to predict admissions decisions using a training set that was
created by biased admissions officers).
9. This type of concern could arise when the outcome, or “label,” is a noisy
measurement of the true outcome of interest. See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 5, at 2227
(arguing that past crime data is distorted relative to actual crime rates). Another concern arises when outcomes are only observed for a sub-group depending on an earlier decision that might itself be biased. This is often referred to as the “selective labels
problem,” and it is of particular concern in the credit context in which borrower default is only observed if they received a loan. See Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jon Kleinberg,
Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, The Selective Labels Problem:
Evaluating Algorithmic Predictions in the Presence of Unobservables, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 23RD ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA
MINING 275, 278 (Ass’n for Computing Machinery ed., 2017), https://dl.acm.org/doi/
10.1145/3097983.3098066 [https://perma.cc/N48T-BDQX] (developing a method
to overcome the problem of selective labels).
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cern is important in the credit context, on which this Article focuses.
There, inputs might be biased because they reflect preexisting disadvantages or replicate biased measurements of borrower characteristics.10 The role of law in addressing these concerns remains contested.
Fair lending law is likely to become a central battleground on
which practitioners and scholars will argue over the application of
discrimination law to algorithmic decision-making. On August 19,
2019, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
published its proposal to replace its rule on the implementation of
the Fair Housing Act from 2013.11 HUD’s Proposed Rule on the Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard12
was one of the first attempts in the United States and worldwide to
create concrete rules to determine whether an algorithm violates fair
lending law. This attempt ultimately failed, and the sections relating
to algorithmic decisions were omitted from the Final Rule, published
on September 24, 2020.13 But HUD made clear that it “expects that
there will be further development in the law in the emerging technology area of algorithms.”14 A recent interagency Request for Information on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in finance also indicates a regulatory focus on algorithmic lending.15 The request
discusses the use of AI and alternative data in credit decisions and
the challenges in establishing that algorithmic lending is consistent

10. See infra Part I.B.
11. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
84 Fed. Reg. 42,854 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
12. Id.
13. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
85 Fed. Reg. 60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). The Proposed Rule
was highly problematic. A crucial focus of the rule is how to scrutinize and justify the
“inputs” into a lender’s algorithm. Despite the Proposed Rule’s attempt to facilitate
“practical business choices . . . that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system,” HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84
Fed. Reg. at 42,855 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 520–33 (2015)), it is confused and contradictory and reflects a
lack of basic understanding of the technology at play. See Lorena Rodriguez, All Data
Is Not Credit Data: Closing the Gap Between the Fair Housing Act and Algorithmic Decisionmaking in the Lending Industry, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1878–79 (2020) (arguing that HUD’s proposed rule is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Inclusive Communities).
14. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
85 Fed. Reg. at 60,290.
15. Request for Information and Comment on Financial Institutions’ Use of Artificial Intelligence, Including Machine Learning, 86 Fed. Reg. 16,837 (Mar. 31, 2021).
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with fair lending laws.16 Algorithmic lending has also been flagged as
a key domain for future regulation outside the United States. The European Union’s proposal for the regulation of AI, revealed in April
2021, presents an ambitious attempt to regulate AI across many domains, and specifically designates creditworthiness assessments as a
“high-risk” domain to be more heavily scrutinized and regulated.17
The stakes in developing such a law are high. The allocation of
credit has been historically distorted by discriminatory policies and
practices.18 From redlining19 to other forms of financial exclusion,20
discriminatory practices have prevented racial minorities from being
equal participants in credit markets.21 Credit pricing always risks
perpetuating this inequality because a lender’s risk assessment is
backward-looking, in that it considers the historical lending behavior
of groups and individuals. And indeed, existing lending practices
have often perpetuated historical injustices in that way, leaving millions of consumers without access to credit,22 including a disproportionate number of Black consumers.23 Algorithmic credit pricing
16. Id. at 16,841 (“[I]t may be challenging to verify that a less transparent and
explainable approach comports with fair lending laws.”).
17. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and
Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e0649735-a372-11eb-9585
-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
[https://perma.cc/H5MA-6W7V]
[hereinafter European Union Proposal].
18. See, e.g., Harold Black, Robert L. Schweitzer & Lewis Mandell, Discrimination
in Mortgage Lending, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 186, 189 (1978) (“[R]ace is an important determinant in the loan decision . . . .”); Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on Discrimination in
Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 41, 45 (1998) (“In the past, mortgage lenders
have clearly discriminated against some groups of borrowers and much of the discrimination was overtly part of their policy guidelines.”).
19. See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing
Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 PA. L. REV. 1285, 1309
(1995) (showing that appraisal maps of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board determined that areas with even a small Black population receive the lowest rating).
20. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP (2017) (documenting how the creation of Black banks further contributed to the wealth gap in the United States).
21. Importantly, part of this exclusion is a result of unequal credit terms. See
KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 257 (2019).
22. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) estimates that in 2019,
7.1 million households were unbanked. See FDIC, HOW AMERICA BANKS: HOUSEHOLD USE
OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 12 (2019). My primary concern is the exclusion
from non-predatory credit markets.
23. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech,
65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 254 (2018) (discussing how Black and Latino households are
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greatly improves the ability of lenders to assess credit risk.24 This
improvement carries both danger and promise for fair lending. The
danger is that algorithms’ greater ability to analyze and distinguish
people based on past lending behavior will further replicate and
even exacerbate past injustices.25 The promise is that algorithms’
improved accuracy in predicting creditworthiness will increase the
availability of credit for formerly excluded consumers and disadvantaged groups.26 The ambition of this Article is to help fair lending realize this promise.27
Against this backdrop I advance two arguments. First, I argue
that the leading approaches to algorithmic discrimination are misguided, even on their own terms. These approaches commit what I
call “the input fallacy” in that they hold on to the input-focused view
of traditional fair lending, even though machine learning pricing
makes this view obsolete. The input fallacy creates an algorithmic
myth of colorblindness28 by fostering the false hope that input exclumore than twice as likely to be unbanked compared to the national average).
24. See Part II.A.2.
25. See Part II.C.
26. For a critical perspective on the focus on access to credit among low-income
consumers, see Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as a Social Provision, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1093, 1099 (2019), arguing that credit, which shifts consumption temporally, is
only beneficial if income increases in the future. Today, however, “credit is fundamentally incompatible with the entrenched intergenerational poverty that plagues
low-income Americans.” Id. Although it is important to recognize that credit is not a
panacea for all economic struggles, and particularly wage stagnation, and that credit
is not beneficial to all consumers at all prices, affordable credit can still play an important role in the creation of wealth. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social
Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1336 (“Access to safe credit is crucial in allowing the poor to escape poverty.”); see also The Use of Cash-Flow Data in Underwriting
Credit: Empirical Research Findings, FINREGLAB 32, 34 (Jul. 2019),
https://finreglab.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/07/FRL_Research-Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N65Q-WQML]
(showing that the use of cash flow data can allow prediction of default risk, providing
an alternative or supplement to traditional credit scores and also that the cash-flow
data were consistently predictive across demographic groups).
27. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 999–
1003 (2006) (arguing that poor communities are excluded from many credit markets
because fringe credit lending is not reported to credit agencies). The persistence of
discriminatory practices can be seen in other consumers domains. See, e.g., Ian Ayres,
Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 817, 819 (1991) (documenting discrimination in the sale of cars); Rory Van Loo,
A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 232 (2009)
(finding that Black debtors fare worse in bankruptcy).
28. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 113
(arguing that “race-consciousness, not color-blindness, is the basis of the prohibition
against discrimination”).
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sion can create non-discriminatory algorithms. Moreover, when input-focused approaches exclude a broad set of inputs, they risk turning fair lending law into a weapon that entrenches the status quo and
undermines the promise of algorithmic credit pricing to create a
more inclusive credit market. Second, I argue that we should instead
explore ways to expand and emphasize regulatory output analysis
through empirical testing of algorithmic outcomes. This outcomesbased approach allows us to face up to the tradeoffs that algorithmic
credit pricing necessarily entails. It enables us to weigh the danger of
disparate credit allocation against the promise of increased credit
access for marginalized groups.
Throughout the Article I use a simulation exercise in which a
hypothetical lender analyzes past loans to make predictions about
future borrowers. For this exercise, I combine the rich Boston Fed
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset,29 which contains information on mortgage applications, with simulated default rates
disciplined by information on the loans.30 My hypothetical lender uses a machine learning algorithm to predict default probability, which
is then used to price credit for future borrowers. In this simulation
exercise, the loan and borrower characteristics serve as the “inputs”
to the credit decisions, while the predicted default probability is the
“output.”
My Article provides discussions of algorithmic bias with new
structure and clarity by distinguishing among different types of input
biases. Current discussions tend to overlook that even traditional
credit pricing relies on borrower characteristics that reflected preexisting disadvantage (“biased world” inputs)31 or were inaccurately
measured (“biased measurement” inputs).32 In the algorithmic con29. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Data for New England, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF BOS. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.bostonfed.org/data/data-items/homemortgage-disclosure-act-hmda-data-for-new-england.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q4Q4
-XRPX].
30. As explained in Part II.B and Appendix A, I fit a model that predicts whether
an application is denied or rejected and then calibrate the rejection rates to publicly
available statistics on default. Therefore, to the extent that there is some relation between a lending decision and borrower default, these simulated default rates may
capture some of the relation between real-world default and borrower characteristics.
31. See infra Part I.B.1. Credit pricing has always considered borrower characteristics that are likely to partially reflect pre-existing disadvantage or discrimination. For example, if women suffer discrimination in the labor market their income
and debt-to-income ratios are “biased-world” inputs.
32. See infra Part I.B.2. If, for example, credit scores only consider certain types
of creditworthiness indicators, such as timely loan payments, but do not consider
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text, as my empirical simulations will demonstrate, the use of biased
inputs can increase disparities in some instances while actually decreasing them in others.
Fair lending law is the primary lens to determine whether disparities in traditional credit pricing amount to discrimination. Fair
lending covers both the doctrine of disparate treatment, dealing with
intentional discrimination, and the doctrine of disparate impact,
dealing with a facially neutral rule that creates impermissible disparities.33 The dominant method for determining whether lender pricing
amounts to discrimination has been to scrutinize decision inputs.34
This has been true not only for disparate treatment, but also—
despite its name—for disparate impact.35 And even though traditional credit pricing was based on few inputs and involved human discretion, scholars have tried to extend this dominant method of input
scrutiny to the algorithmic context.36
This Article challenges three leading approaches to discrimination law in the algorithmic context that scrutinize inputs.37 The first
approach excludes protected characteristics, primarily as a method
for negating a claim of intentional discrimination. Goldman Sachs, for
instance, recently relied on such an approach when it responded to a
complaint that a man received a credit line twenty times higher than
timely rent payments, and those indicators are less likely to be available for racial
minority borrowers, then credit scores are a “biased measurement” input of creditworthiness. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit, FED. RSRV. S-2
(Aug. 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/
creditscore.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ8Z-RAVV] (finding that recent immigrants have
lower credit scores than implied by loan performance and recommending that the
type of information supplied to credit-reporting agencies to include routine payments such as rent be expanded).
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. See infra Part I.C. For disparate treatment, the central question is whether a
borrower’s protected characteristic played a role in setting the price and thereby
served as an “input” in the decision. The legal doctrine of disparate impact also focuses on analyzing decision inputs after an initial demonstration of the outcome disparities. As discussed in further detail below, although the prima facie case of disparate
impact requires a showing of disparities, the analysis revolves around the cause of
the disparities.
35. See infra Part I.C.
36. See Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 459, 460 (2019); Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 183–84. This is also true of
other areas of discrimination law. See Kim, supra note 5. See generally Barocas &
Selbst, supra note 5, at 694.
37. Many of these proposals are not only intended to apply to fair lending, but
also have a direct bearing on how discrimination law would apply in algorithmic
credit pricing.
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his wife38 by arguing that it was not possible for Goldman Sachs to
discriminate against her because its algorithms “do not know your
gender” and do not make decisions “based on factors like gender.”39
The problem with this first approach is that information about a
person’s protected characteristics is embedded in other information
about the individual, so that a protected characteristic can be
“known” to an algorithm even when it is formally excluded. I demonstrate this by predicting “age” and “marital status,” two protected
characteristics under fair lending law,40 from the other variables
within the HMDA dataset.41
There are several reasons we should be concerned about the
ability to predict protected characteristics from other data. Consider
an algorithmic lender who is required to comply with the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and cannot discriminate against borrowers based on their age.42 The lender is aware, however, that older
38. Neil Vigdor, Apple Card Investigated After Gender Discrimination Complaints,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/business/Apple
-credit-card-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/99GH-3JWD].
39. Shahien Nasiripour, Jennifer Surane & Sridhar Natarajan, Apple Card’s Gender-Bias Claims Look Familiar to Old-School Banks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 11,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-11/apple-card-s
-ai-stumble-looks-familiar-to-old-school-banks [https://perma.cc/3NTJ-P9LS].
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of . . . marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).”).
41. The ability to predict “marital status” and “age” using the Boston Fed HMDA
dataset is likely to be the lower bound on the ability to predict protected characteristics in the algorithmic context. This is because HMDA primarily contains traditional
credit pricing variables, unlike “nontraditional” data discussed in Part II.A.1.
42. ECOA requires that lenders not directly or intentionally discriminate against
an older borrower or use a neutral rule that has a disproportionate effect on older
borrowers. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). However, the requirement to not consider “age” under ECOA is more complex than would seem based on the text of ECOA alone. Regulation B contains specific provisions related to age. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6(b)(2).
Whether and how a creditor can use age in a credit decision depends on the system
used. According to 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6(b)(2)(ii), when using “an empirically derived,
demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system, a creditor may use an
applicant’s age as a predictive variable, provided that the age of an elderly applicant
is not assigned a negative factor or value.” Assuming algorithmic credit pricing meets
the criteria of a “demonstrably and statistically sound” scoring system as defined in
12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(p), it is unclear how a lender using an algorithm will ever be able
to show that they have met the requirement that “applicants age 62 years or older
must be treated at least as favorably as applicants who are under age 62.” 12 C.F.R.
Pt. 1002(6)(b)(2), supp. I. This is because with algorithmic pricing, unlike expert
based scoring, the weights are not pre-assigned to different characteristics. Similarly,
one must be wary of interpreting the weight on “age” as the true and stable contribution of that variable to a prediction. See Kathryn P. Taylor, Equal Credit for All—An
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borrowers are different from other borrowers.43 They often have
less documented credit history and tend to use cash more frequently.44 And it is also aware of course that an older person is less likely
to live long enough to repay their loan before dying. Imagine that the
lender then applies a machine learning algorithm to predict borrower default risk from the borrower’s Amazon purchase history. Given
the close relationship between age and default risk, the algorithm
will recover the borrower’s age based on their purchase history,
even though the lender formally excluded age from the algorithm.
The exclusion of protected characteristics thus creates a meaningless
façade of neutrality.
We should also be wary of excluding protected characteristics if
we care about outcome disparities.45 As I demonstrate through a
simulated example, price disparities can actually decrease when algorithms are “race aware.” This is because a characteristic may need
to be interpreted differently for various racial groups.46 Conversely,
we may increase disparities when we exclude the race variable because we are imposing a similar interpretation of a characteristic for
both white and non-white applicants.
The second approach I discuss expands the exclusion of inputs
to proxies for protected characteristics. This approach recognizes
that other inputs may act as “proxies” for protected characteristics
and therefore should be excluded too.47 The approach, however, is
Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 326, 338 (1978) (“The Amendments set limits on the use of age in credit scoring
systems, and prohibit the assignment of a negative value to the age of an elderly applicant.”). I therefore conclude that it is unlikely that algorithmic credit pricing can
consider age under current regulations.
43. A recent report by Deloitte shows how age is one of the most important factors in black box AI models of credit risk. See Explain Artificial Intelligence for Credit
Risk Management, DELOITTE 4 (Apr. 2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/fr/Documents/risk/Publications/deloitte_artificial-intelligence-credit
-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XJR-WFFL].
44. See Mary Jane Large, The Credit Decision and Its Aftermath, BANKING L.J. 4,
20–22 (1980) (discussing the background to the enactment of ECOA and the prohibition of discrimination based on age).
45. As discussed further in Part III, the exclusion of protected characteristics
may be considered a fair procedure, regardless of its impact on disparities. This question closely relates to the more general debate on procedural versus substantive justice. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
What is particularly striking about this context is the extent to which the formal exclusion of the characteristic is unlikely to mean the characteristic was not considered,
regardless of the raw disparities among groups.
46. See infra Part III.A.2.
47. HUD Proposed Rule 2019 is an example of an attempt to formally incorporate this position. In HUD’s circulated draft of its Proposed Rule, a lender can defend
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not feasible when there is no agreed-upon definition of a proxy, and
when complex interactions between variables are unidentifiable to
the human eye. Even inputs that have traditionally been thought of
as proxies for race, such as zip codes, may be less concerning than
other ways in which we can recover a borrower’s race. Using the
HMDA data, I demonstrate that there is a greater ability to predict
“race” from the traditional credit pricing inputs in HMDA than from
zip codes. Similarly, although it may be possible, for example, to require lenders to exclude clear proxies for age from datasets, the
combination of many consumer behaviors can still reveal borrower
age.
The third approach I discuss restricts algorithm inputs to preapproved features. It thus differs from the first two approaches,
which allow all inputs other than certain forbidden features. Although this third approach may allow for greater control over what
algorithms use to price credit, it does not guarantee a reduction in
disparities. Moreover, it risks restricting access to credit by limiting
an algorithm to traditional credit pricing inputs and further perpetuating the exclusion of consumers lacking formal credit histories,
which are disproportionately racial minorities.48
The three approaches share a common fallacy. They scrutinize
decision inputs, even though such scrutiny is no longer feasible or
effective in the algorithmic context. In committing this input fallacy,
they remain focused on two causal questions that lie at the heart of
traditional fair lending: first, whether a protected characteristic had
a causal effect on the credit decision (disparate treatment), and second, whether the inputs into credit decisions caused impermissible
disparities (disparate impact).49 However, machine learning is a
world of correlation and not causation.

an algorithm by demonstrating that it does “not rely in any material part on factors
that are substitutes or close proxies for protected classes under the Fair Housing
Act.” See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,862 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
100).
48. See CFPB Off. of Rsch., Data Point: Credit Invisibles, CFPB 6 (May 2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UNG-B5C9] (“Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than Whites
or Asians to be credit invisible or to have unscored credit records.”).
49. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent
Versus Impact, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1472 (2005) (“By definition, all discrimination
claims require plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal connection between the challenged
decision or outcome and a protected status characteristic.”). This is further developed in Part IV.A.
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Instead of continuing to commit the input fallacy, fair lending
law must shift to outcome-focused analysis.50 For when it is no longer possible to scrutinize inputs, outcome analysis provides the only
way to evaluate whether a pricing method leads to impermissible
disparities. This is true for the legal doctrine of disparate impact,
which has always cared about outcomes, even when it did so by scrutinizing inputs.51 And it is also true for disparate treatment, a doctrine that has historically been quite detached from disparate outcomes.52 In the algorithmic context, both can no longer rely on input
scrutiny but must analyze outcomes.
I end the Article by proposing a testing method that regulators
should use to analyze the discriminatory effects of algorithmic pricing rules. My testing method applies a credit pricing rule to a dataset
of hypothetical borrowers. Regulators can then examine the outcomes of the pricing rule to determine whether the pricing rule discriminates. This method of outcome-focused testing resembles the
first stage of a disparate impact complaint in traditional fair lending
law but adapts it to the machine learning context.
Because the criteria for determining discrimination continue to
be disputed, I do not provide an exact test. Instead, I show that my
testing method for algorithmic outcomes can answer meaningful
questions. The first such question is whether the pricing rule treats
borrowers who are “similarly situated” equally. The second question
is whether the pricing rule increases or decreases disparities relative
to some baseline, such as the non-algorithmic credit pricing method.
My outcome-focused test reflects the need to adopt an empirical
and experimental approach to discrimination. In the algorithmic
world, we can no longer determine a priori how inputs relate to outcomes. We do not know whether an algorithm is using a protected
characteristic from observing the algorithm’s inputs.53 Similarly, we
cannot reliably predict whether an algorithmic method will increase
or decrease disparities by looking only at inputs.54 By contrast, my
50. Some previous writing on discrimination and artificial intelligence has suggested that greater focus should be placed on outcomes. See, e.g., Anupam Chander,
The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039 (2017) (reviewing FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015)) (“The focus on outcomes rather than how an algorithm operates
seems especially useful as algorithms become increasingly complicated, even able to
modify themselves.”).
51. See infra Part I.C.
52. See infra Part I.C.
53. See infra Part I.B.
54. See infra Part I.B.
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outcome-focused testing method can measure the actual effects of a
credit pricing rule.55 It can thus provide regulators with a workable
and appropriate Regtech response to the Fintech industry, by deploying technology to fight discrimination.56
My critique of input-based approaches and my proposal of outcome-focused tests chart a course for discrimination law in an algorithmic world beyond just the context of fair lending. Both speak
more broadly to the challenges of enforcing anti-discrimination law
in algorithmic contexts, from employment to criminal justice.57 The
Article also contributes to discussions in the computer science and
statistical literature on algorithmic fairness, by demonstrating how
legal doctrine and regulatory realities should inform our evaluations
of algorithmic decisions.58
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the traditional world of credit lending and presents the distinction between
“biased world” inputs and “biased measurement” inputs. Part II turns
to the new world of algorithmic credit pricing, describing the primary changes and their meaning for the problem of biased inputs. Part
III discusses the main approaches to discrimination law in the algorithmic context and shows that they are inadequate on their own
terms and also otherwise undesirable. Part IV argues that the move
to algorithmic pricing requires a fundamental shift in fair lending law

55. See infra Part IV.A.
56. For an example of an attempt by the CFPB to regulate through technology
and a discussion of how the CFPB leverages digital tools to attempt to help consumers find credit, see Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1304
(2017).
57. Other papers discuss the application of discrimination in other areas of law.
See Kim, supra note 5 (employment discrimination); Daniel Westreich & James
Grimmelmann, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV.: ONLINE 164 (Apr.
2017), (criminal justice discrimination); Allan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 563 (2016) (employment discrimination). See generally Chander, supra note 50, at 1024 (describing
the impact of algorithmic decision-making in numerous areas).
58. See, e.g., Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold &
Richard Zemel, Fairness Through Awareness, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INNOVATIONS IN
THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE CONFERENCE 214, 214 (Ass’n for Computing Machinery
ed., 2012) https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2090236.2090255 [https://perma
.cc/T2U3-TNQ6] (discussing an individual fairness approach to algorithmic fairness);
see also Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness:
A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning, ARXIV, Aug. 14, 2018, at 1,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00023 [https://perma.cc/4YEM-7747]. For a recent survey of the literature, see Ninareh Mehrabi, Fred Morstatter, Nripsuta Saxena, Kristina
Lerman & Aram Galstyan, A Survey on Bias and Fairness in Machine Learning, ACM
COMPUTING SURVS., Jul. 2022 at 1.
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from input scrutiny to outcome analysis and develops an empirical
method for outcome analysis.
I. PRICING CREDIT BASED ON BIASED INPUTS
When pricing credit, lenders often offer people different loan
terms based on their individual predicted default probability using
borrower characteristics and the loan specifics. In this Part, I discuss
how there is commercial and social value in accurately predicting default risk, which underlies differential pricing. However, when characteristics vary by group because they reflect bias, their use to price
credit differentially may entrench bias. As I elaborate, traditional discrimination law addresses this tension by either prohibiting the direct use of a protected characteristic or by limiting pricing policies
that could further bias.
In this Part, I focus on traditional credit lending, before discussing algorithmic credit pricing, to highlight what is likely to change.
This is important because current concerns over the fairness of credit pricing algorithms overlook the fact that even traditional credit
pricing relied on borrower characteristics that reflected pre-existing
disadvantage (“biased world” inputs) or were inaccurately measured
(“biased measurement” inputs).
I begin by providing an overview of a credit pricing decision that
presents the terminology I will use throughout the Article. I then discuss the distinction between “biased world” and “biased measurement” inputs and how they effect a pricing decision. I end by discussing how traditional fair lending law has dealt with the tension
between personalized pricing that relies on biased inputs and the
benefits of accurate default prediction.59
A. THE CREDIT PRICING DECISION
Credit contracts are often personalized,60 meaning that lenders
will determine the specific terms of the contract based on the charac59. There are other concerns that can arise in the context of credit pricing that I
do not fully address. For example, a lender could intentionally deny credit to a member of a protected group, motivated by animus; what economists typically refer to as
“taste-based discrimination.” See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2010). I focus on the problem of biased inputs, first, because of the prevalence of biased inputs in lending decisions, and second, because the use of biased inputs creates an opportunity and challenge for algorithmic pricing, as will be
discussed in Part II.C.
60. Not all credit is personalized, and not all credit is personalized to the same
extent. The personalization of credit contracts can be costly, so that the degree of
personalization may depend on the magnitude of the credit contract. For mortgages,
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teristics of the borrower and the specific loan. We can therefore articulate the pricing decision as one in which inputs, x, are used to determine the outcome, y. The inputs, x, are the variables or characteristics that the lender uses to determine the outcome. The outcome, y,
could be the interest rate of the loan or the fees associated with the
loan or whether to approve the loan altogether.61
Pricing inputs could include borrower characteristics, such as
the borrower’s income or years of education, as well as the characteristics of the loan application, such as the loan amount. Because
credit contracts require an upfront transfer of money for a future
promise of payments, lenders face challenges of asymmetric information as to the borrower’s willingness and ability to repay a loan,
adverse selection, and moral hazard.62 One way to overcome these
challenges is to price the risk through interest rates and other
terms63 and through an assessment of creditworthiness, which is essentially a prediction about future borrower behavior and finances.
In traditional mortgage lending, a borrower’s creditworthiness is assessed based on past credit behavior, often with the assistance of a
credit bureau, such as Experian or Equifax, or based on a borrower’s
FICO score.64 The borrower’s income and future income are assessed
to determine borrower liquidity. Lenders also use the specific characteristics of the loan, and the securitized property, to determine the
terms of the loan, such as the interest rate. The exact terms of the

which are typically large loan contracts, there is likely to be a degree of personalization. But this can also be true of smaller loans and other types of debt, such as auto
loans.
61. In this Article, I focus on interest rates, but this is only one element of the
cost of a mortgage. The overall cost of a mortgage is determined by other costs such
as “discount points” and the compensation to the loan officer and broker. See generally Neil Bhutta, Andreas Fuster & Aurel Hizmo, Paying Too Much? Price Dispersion in
the US Mortgage Market (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Working Paper
No. 2020-062, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/paying-toomuch-price
-dispersion-in-the-us-mortgage-market.htm [https://perma.cc/67TG-9HC2].
62. See George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECONS. 488, 488 (1970).
63. A loan’s interest rate is only one term through which to consider the cost of
a loan. Many other fees, such as closing fees, also increase the cost of the loan.
64. Developed in 1989 by Fair, Isaac and Company, the standard FICO score was
meant to create a generic model that would allow for comparing the reports of the
various credit reporting agencies. This standardized system for scoring consumers
quickly became the industry standard credit score used today. See Shweta Arya,
Catherine Eckel & Colin Wichman, 96 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 175, 175 (2013).
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loan vary greatly across borrowers; therefore, there is a degree of
personalization of the prices paid by borrowers.65
Credit terms are also personalized because they are partially determined by lender employees or brokers (jointly “loan officers”)
who have discretion.66 In traditional mortgage lending the originator
sets the lowest price at which they are willing to extend a loan. Borrowers then meet with loan officers who help set the exact terms of
the loan. Loan officers are often incentivized to provide a more expensive loan.67
Throughout this Article I focus on credit pricing that results
from the prediction of default probability of the borrower. The lender predicts the default probability and then uses this default probability to directly set the price of the loan, such as the interest rate of
the loan. I therefore refer interchangeably to the outcome, y, as the
predicted default probability and the loan price.68
65. In the U.S., there is in fact significant variation in the cost of credit for different borrowers, expressed by the variation in credit terms such as the interest rate
and fees of the loan. Andreas Fuster, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Tarun Ramadorai &
Angsar Walther, Predictably Unequal? The Effects of Machine Learning on Credit Markets, 76 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 15, Table I) (on file with author)
(providing a description of the variation in interest rates).
66. This is because mortgage lenders often create borrower “bins” based on a
limited set of characteristics in determining par rates. These bins are often not based
on sophisticated risk predictions but rather reflect more coarse divisions between
lenders. As I have discussed elsewhere, it is not clear how exactly loan officers decide
the final terms of the loan. For example, it is largely unknown whether loan officers
are concerned with assessing credit worthiness or trying to learn a borrower’s willingness-to-pay. See Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36.
67. The difference between the “par rate” and the final rate was known as the
“yield spread premium” and was used to compensate loan officers. In the wake of the
financial crisis, new regulations from 2010 prohibited loan officer compensation
from directly being tied to a loan’s interest rate. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z),
75 Fed. Reg. 58,505–08 (proposed Sept. 24, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). Even
absent direct compensation for higher interest rates, more expensive loans are clearly more profitable for lenders and could ultimately affect loan officer compensation.
See Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of
Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 289 (2007) (discussing how yield
spread premiums lead to higher mortgage prices for consumers, which may fall disproportionately on the least sophisticated borrowers).
68. One can, in theory, separate the “prediction” problem from the “decision”
problem. See, e.g., Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel & Aziz
Huq, Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD
ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING
797, 797 (Ass’n for Computing Machinery ed., 2017) https://dl.acm
.org/doi/10.1145/3097983.3098095 [https://perma.cc/X7LJ-Q2BA].
Despite my focus on default probability, in reality, default prediction is rarely the
only metric used to personalize credit contracts. Personalization could reflect wheth-
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There are several reasons that accurate default prediction might
be beneficial for both lenders and borrowers and provide reasons we
would want to personalize credit pricing. When a lender can accurately predict default, they can determine a cutoff for extending a
loan or price risk accordingly.69 Flat pricing, by contrast, can create
significant harm because of the adverse selection of less creditworthy borrowers who will choose to pay the higher interest rate,70
which can, in turn, lead to the drying up of credit markets altogether.
Moreover, default and foreclosure are costly for both lenders and
consumers.71
The accurate pricing of credit could also mean the ultimate expansion of access to credit. When lenders cannot distinguish between the risk of different borrowers, they may avoid lending to
larger groups of applicants. The more accurate a lender’s prediction,
the more they are able to distinguish borrowers with different levels
of risk. This may mean that some borrowers are less risky than previously believed, which will expand access to credit, or that even

er the loan is securitized or the purpose of the loan, as well as the costs of administering the loan to the particular borrower. The personalized terms could also reflect the
lender’s assessment of the borrower’s willingness to pay for the loan. A recent study
suggests that there is a high degree of dispersion in the prices of mortgages suggesting that many borrowers overpay for mortgages because they do not shop around or
negotiate for a better rate. See Bhutta et al., supra note 61. I focus on default prediction personalization since this is arguably the least controversial basis for personalization. See, e.g., Robert Bartlett, Adair Morse, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Consumer Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 50 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 25,943, 2019).
The significance of price discrimination is likely to increase in the future. See The
Effects of Online Disclosure About Personalized Pricing on Consumers 7 (Org. for Econ.
Coop. and Dev., Working Paper No. 303, 2021) (“[T]he quantity of personal data held
on online consumers, combined with the increasing prevalence of personalization in
other domains (e.g., advertisement), means there is at least potential for online personalized pricing to become more commonplace and more sophisticated.”).
69. This is often referred to as “risk based pricing.” See Robert Phillips, Optimizing Prices for Consumer Credit, 12 J. REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 360, 365 (2013) (“[A]
riskier customer should pay a higher price in order to compensate for the higher
probability of default and the associated cost to the lender.”); see also Michael Staten,
Risk-Based Pricing in Consumer Lending, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 33, 33 (2015).
70. See Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Observing Unobservables: Identifying
Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment, 77 ECONOMETRICA
1993, 1993 (2009) (using an experiment to document the existence of moral hazard
in consumer credit markets).
71. See John Gathergood, Benedict Guttman-Kenney & Stefan Hunt, How Do Payday Loans Affect Borrowers? Evidence from the U.K. Market, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 496, 496
(2019) (showing that payday loans cause persistent increases in defaults and cause
consumers to exceed their bank overdraft limits).
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riskier borrowers can receive a loan at a certain cost.72 This is particularly likely to be the case in the tails of default prediction, i.e., for
people with a higher probability of default.
B. THE PROBLEM OF BIASED INPUTS
Most inputs into a credit pricing decision in the traditional context reflect bias; however, the origin of that bias can vary greatly for
different inputs. In this Section, I distinguish between a biased input
that results from some historic or existing discrimination external to
the lender itself (“biased world”) and an input that is biased because
of the way it defines and estimates a characteristic (“biased measurement”). Although analytically distinguishable, the difference between the two is often empirically indistinguishable.
A primary concern with personalized prices for credit is that it
creates or further increases disparities among groups. Here I focus
on bias that affects “protected groups,” meaning the categories of
people that discrimination law seeks to protect.73 We therefore
might be concerned that the way in which we predict default, and
price credit accordingly, creates disparities among legally protected
groups. As will be discussed further in Section I.C, fair lending prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, marital status
and age, among other grounds.
1. Biased World
Lenders seeking to personalize credit terms to borrowers confront the problem that many of the factors used to determine individual risk are a product of pre-existing disadvantage or discrimination.74 Although this is not the lender’s fault, using these inputs
exacerbates the effects of existing discrimination in a new domain.
There is no consensus on whether the use of biased world inputs
gives rise to discrimination claims.75
72. See Liran Einav, Mark Jenkins & Jonathan Levin, The Impact of Credit Scoring
on Consumer Lending, 44 RAND J. ECON. 249, 249 (2013) (showing that the adoption of
automated credit scoring at a large auto finance company led to higher-risk applicant
lending).
73. The two Acts that determine the protected groups for fair lending are the
ECOA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)-(2), and the Fair Housing Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–
07.
74. I use the term “discrimination” here to describe a reality in which a group is
unfairly treated without considering whether those circumstances give formal rise to
a claim of legal discrimination. This is sometimes referred to as “structural disadvantage.” See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 691.
75. See infra Part I.C. According to some theories of discrimination, the use of
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There are several examples of “biased world” inputs. A central
factor for determining repayment risk is a borrower’s income. Past
research has shown a significant racial and gender pay gap in the
United States.76 These gaps may be a result of “pre-market factors,”
such as reduced access to higher education, or a result of labor market discrimination.77 Similarly, higher rates of incarceration of racial
“biased world” inputs does not give rise to a claim of discrimination. According to
other theories, a situation of “compounding injustice” could trigger discrimination
law. Deborah Hellman coined this term to describe a decision that “exacerbates the
harm caused by the prior injustice because it entrenches the harm or carries it into
another domain.” Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid
Compounding Injustice, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 107 (Hugh
Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2017).
76. See Kayla Fontenot, Jessica Semega & Melissa Kollar, Income and Poverty in
the United States: 2017, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU 6, 8–9 (Sept. 2018), https://www.census
.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-263.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MGM2-SXXE]. Importantly, the Black-white wage gap has increased as
wage inequality has risen from 2000 to 2018. See Elise Gould, State of Working America:
Wages
2018,
ECON.
POL’Y
INST.
4
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://www.epi.org/publication/state-of-american-wages-2018 [https://perma.cc/
K2JR-Q992].
77. Pre-market factors are typically understood as factors that are used to “explain” wage gaps. The challenge is that these factors might themselves be a product of
discrimination. For example, lenders often consider whether a borrower is selfemployed, which may be used to determine that the borrower’s future income is less
stable. See Alicia H. Munnell, Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne & James
McEneaney, Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV.
25, 29 (1996) (finding that the probability that a loan request made by someone who
is self-employed will be denied is roughly one third greater than the average denial
rate); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (arguing that Black workers with the same ability
and education earn less than comparable white workers or have fewer employment
opportunities).
While the racial wage gap in the labor market is well documented, interpreting
this gap and the extent to which it reflects either taste-based or statistical discrimination has proven difficult. See Dan Black, Amelia Haviland, Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor, Why Do Minority Men Earn Less? A Study of Wage Differentials Among the Highly
Educated, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 300, 300 (2006) (finding substantial wage gaps between Black men and men of other races and discussing challenges in attributing gap
to prejudice); see also Eric Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage:
Individual and Occupational Determinants of Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV.
542, 563 (2001) (finding that although Black men have gradually gained entry to
highly compensated occupational positions, they have simultaneously become subject to more extreme racial disadvantages in respect to earning power); Roland G.
Fryer Jr., Devah Pager & Jörg L. Spenkuch, Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered
Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON. 633, 690 (2013) (estimating that differential treatment accounts for at least one third of the Black-white wage gap). Other studies have identified racial disparities in access to the labor market. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A
Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004)
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minorities could have a negative impact on credit scores as well.78
Levels of debt might also reflect pre-existing disadvantage. For example, high-interest lenders, such as payday lenders, often target
minorities, leading to the accumulation of higher levels of debt.79
There is also evidence that credit card lenders may screen for minority consumers.80
When a lender uses variables that reflect pre-existing disadvantage, or a biased world, it compounds that disadvantage by carrying it into the new domain of lending. The biased input is then used
to price credit that is more expensive for the disadvantaged group or
even to deny credit altogether. Because credit is a way of creating
wealth, this discrepancy in credit pricing risks reinforcing wealth
gaps in the United States.
2. Biased Measurement
Many inputs into a pricing decision partially reflect measurement bias, meaning that the way in which an input is defined or estimated is biased rather than the underlying characteristic. While
lenders may have more control over estimation that causes “biased
measurement” inputs than “biased world” inputs, practically, these
two types of biases are often indistinguishable.
The general reference to “borrower characteristics” masks the
fact that any characteristic requires some sort of definition, meas(finding that white-sounding names triggered a callback rate that was 50% higher
than that of equally qualified applicants with Black-sounding names); see also John M.
Nunley, Adam Pugh, Nicholas Romero & R. Alan Seals, Racial Discrimination in the
Labor Market for Recent College Graduates: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 15 B.E. J.
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1097, 1097 (2015).
78. A recent paper documented the negative impact of incarceration on credit
scores and income. See Abhay P. Aneja & Carlos F. Avenancio-León, No Credit for Time
Served? Incarceration and Credit-Driven Crime Cycles, 109 AEA PAPERS AND PROC. 161
(2019). If Black defendants are more likely to be incarcerated, then the use of credit
scores and income presents another way in which credit decisions rely on preexisting disadvantage.
79. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66 (2008); Cassandra Jones Havard, “On the Take”: The Black Box
of Credit Scoring and Mortgage Discrimination, B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 241, 241 (2011) (arguing that subprime lending was incontrovertibly steered toward minority communities); Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of Color, GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 169 (2010)
(describing various marketing practices used by lenders to target minorities for
predatory loans).
80. See Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 180–81 (2013) (“Credit card companies confine low-income
individuals to a subprime market and attempt to steer many middle-class African
American and Latinos into subprime loans.”).
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urement, and estimation. For example, if we want to use a borrower’s income, we must define what income is and how to calculate a
borrower’s income. For instance, we will need to determine whether
certain transfers, such as gifts from relatives, are considered income,
or whether to consider public assistance income.81 It might also require a determination of the documentation needed to consider a
transfer “income.” When a definition systematically disadvantages a
protected group, however, then it could be a case of “measurement
bias.”82
Another type of “biased measurement” could arise when a substitute or a proxy is used in lieu of the characteristic that is of true
interest. Often the variable that is of true interest is unobserved and
so a lender might instead rely on a close substitute.83
In Subsection III.A.1, I provide an example in which a borrower’s
“education” is used as a substitute for the borrower’s “ability,” which
is relevant in determining future income. As “ability” is not observed
by the lender, they could use borrower education as a proxy. If racial
minorities are less likely to go to college for any given level of ability,
this proxy will cause measurement bias. In this example, the problem
I have highlighted is not necessarily created by pre-existing discrimination but by the imperfect measurement of the underlying variable
of interest.
One central characteristic used to price credit, a borrower’s
credit score, may suffer from measurement bias. The exact inputs
and models used to determine a credit score, such as a FICO score, is
proprietary information, so it is hard to know for certain how these
scores may be biased. However, we do know that credit scores have
traditionally considered a few measures of creditworthiness like
lending from large financial institutions and mortgage payments.
Other measures of creditworthiness, such as timely rental payments

81. In fact, ECOA directly addresses this issue by prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of whether an applicant is a recipient of public assistance income. The motivation behind adding this protected group was the conduct of lenders who refused to
consider such income for the purpose of extending a loan. See Taylor, supra note 42,
at 339.
82. The type of measurement bias I discuss here is “feature bias,” which is bias
in the predictors x. There is a second type of measurement bias called “label bias,”
which is bias in y. See Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 58 at 18 (arguing that label
bias is the more severe bias).
83. In the context of employment, this issue often arises when characteristics
such as job performance are measured using information such as supervisor’s evaluations, which may be biased. See Kim, supra note 5, at 876.
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or borrowing from smaller and more local financial institutions, may
also be predictive of default.84
Although the theoretical distinction between “biased world” and
“biased measurement” is clear, in many cases, a variable might combine the two types of biases. For example, a borrower’s income could
reflect both pre-existing discrimination in labor markets as well as
some kind of measurement bias. This is problematic for the view that
the use of variables that reflect a “biased world” are permissible
while variables that reflect “biased measurement” are impermissible,
discussed in more detail in Section I.C.85
Moreover, it is unclear whether, as an empirical matter, it is
possible to distinguish between these two types of biases. We can
learn whether a certain variable correlates with race, but we might
not be able to determine the origin of the correlation. Above, I presented intuitive explanations for why a variable might correlate with
race, but this is a far cry from establishing the source and explanation for the correlation or whether it stems from pre-existing discrimination or measurement bias.
C. TRADITIONAL FAIR LENDING LAW
Fair lending law is the primary lens through which to consider
the personalization of credit pricing. Therefore, this Section provides
an overview of fair lending law, which covers both the doctrine of
disparate treatment, dealing with intentional discrimination, as well
as disparate impact, dealing with facially neutral rules that have an
impermissible impact. Because there are ongoing disputes with respect to the foundations and scope of the disparate impact doctrine, I
84. The fact that only certain types of behaviors are measured by credit scores
could mean that some borrowers are not scored at all. Many consumers have thin
credit files because they are less likely to access the types of financial services that
report to the traditional credit bureaus. See Persis Yu, Jillian McLaughlin & Marina
Levy, Big Data: A Big Disappointment for Scoring Consumer Creditworthiness, NAT’L
CONSUMER L. CTR. 12 (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/
report-big-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4SK-NXD5]. According to the CFPB, Black
and Latino consumers are more likely to be credit invisible, at rates of around 15% in
comparison to 9% for whites. See CFPB Off. of Rsch., supra note 48, at 24–25.
In September 2021, Fannie Mae announced that it will begin considering timely
rental payments in underwriting calculations. See Ron Lieber, Always Pay the Rent? It
May Help Your Mortgage Application, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/11/your-money/paying-rent-mortgage.html
[https://perma.cc/42DS-FS5T].
85. See Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein,
Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 28–29, 33–34 (2018)
for the distinction between “group differences in the raw data” and biases for the
“choice of predictors.”
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discuss how the different positions view the problem of biased inputs, but I do not adopt a particular interpretation.
The two laws that form the core of credit pricing discrimination
are the Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974. The FHA, also known as Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, protects renters and buyers from discrimination by sellers or landlords and covers a range of housing related
conduct, including the setting of credit terms.86 The FHA prohibits
discrimination in the terms of credit based on race, color, religion,
sex, disability, familial status, and national origins.87 In 1974, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), banning discrimination in all types of credit transactions. ECOA complements
FHA by expanding discrimination provisions to other credit contexts
beyond housing related credit. Initially, ECOA only covered sex and
marital status discrimination but was then amended in 1976 to also
cover race, color, religion, and other grounds of discrimination.88
ECOA and FHA cover both discrimination doctrines of “disparate
treatment,” dealing with the direct condition of a decision on a protected characteristic, often with the intent to discriminate, and “disparate impact,” which typically involves a facially neutral rule that
has a disparate effect on protected groups. ECOA and FHA do not explicitly recognize the two discrimination doctrines in the language of
the law itself. However, the disparate impact doctrine has been rec86. In 1988, the Fair Housing Amendments Act was passed, strengthening the
mortgage lending provisions of the FHA. See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act and Emerging Litigation Regarding the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 180–81 (2009).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018) (“To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services
or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” (emphasis added)).
88. There are other laws that have additional provisions relating to credit pricing discrimination that are not the focus of this Article. The Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977 (CRA) encourages banks and other lenders to address the needs of lowincome households within the areas they operate, which often overlaps with serving
racial minority areas. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901–08). The CRA does not give a right to private action but rather instructs the relevant supervisory agency on how to ensure that institutions are serving the lending needs of their community. Another federal law related to credit pricing discrimination is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HDMA). Pub. L. No.
94-200, 89 Stat. 1124 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–11), which requires that certain
financial institutions make regular disclosures to the public on mortgage applications
and lending. Although HMDA does not contain any explicit discrimination provisions,
one of its purposes is to allow the public and regulators to consider whether lenders
are treating certain borrowers in certain areas differently. The empirical sections of
this Article rely on HMDA data.
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ognized in the case of credit pricing by courts and agencies in charge
of enforcing the laws. The Supreme Court recently affirmed that disparate impact claims could be made under the FHA in Inclusive
Communities,89 confirming the position of eleven appellate courts
and various federal agencies, including HUD, the agency primarily
responsible for enforcing the FHA.90 Although there is not an equivalent Supreme Court case with respect to ECOA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and courts have found that the statute allows
for a claim of disparate impact.91
Disparate treatment involves the direct conditioning of the decision on a protected characteristic and therefore focuses on the causal
connection between a protected characteristic and a credit decision.92 The doctrine can be triggered by directly considering a protected characteristic, such as race, in a specific credit decision or
when a protected characteristic is used in setting general lending
policy, such as in the case of “redlining.”93 Disparate treatment iden89. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 546–47 (2015).
90. See Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New and What’s Not, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 106 (2015) (“The Court’s
5-4 decision in the ICP case endorsed forty years of practice under the FHA, during
which the impact theory of liability had been adopted by all eleven federal appellate
courts to consider the matter.”).
91. See, e.g., Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 922,
926–27 (N.D. Cal. 2008); CFPB Consumer Laws and Regulations: Equal Credit Opportunity Act, CFPB 1 (June 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_
cfpb_laws-and-regulations_ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBE4
-ZCWC] (“The ECOA has two principal theories of liability: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.”). During the Trump Administration, the CFPB proposed abandoning disparate impact liability under the ECOA. See Press Release, CFPB, Statement of
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection on Enactment of SJ Res 57 (May 21,
2018) https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/statement-bureau
-consumer-financial-protection-enactment-sj-res-57 [https://perma.cc/8MJS-63Q7]
(stating that the CFPB will reexamine its guidance on disparate impact liability under
the ECOA). For a skeptical view of whether the statutory language of ECOA supports
disparate impact, see Peter N. Cubita & Michelle Hartmann, The ECOA Discrimination
Proscription and Disparate Impact — Interpreting the Meaning of the Words That Actually Are There, 61 BUS. L. 829, 829 (2006).
92. In the employment discrimination context, see Sullivan, supra note 5, at 408,
suggesting that one way to read Title VII is that it “embraces a causal view of what we
call disparate treatment”.
93. Redlining is the practice of denying credit to borrowers from predominantly
minority neighborhoods and is typically considered a case of disparate treatment.
Some early trial cases established the disparate treatment claim under the theory of
“redlining.” See, e.g., Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 491 (S.D.
Ohio 1976). The theory behind redlining is that the racial composition of an area was
used to make a loan decision and therefore the decision depended directly on a pro-
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tifies cases in which a protected characteristic directly influenced a
credit decision and is therefore concerned with the causal relationship between protected characteristics and decisions.
Disparate impact, the second discrimination doctrine under FHA
and ECOA, covers cases in which a facially neutral rule has an impermissible disparate effect. A disparate impact case typically follows the burden-shifting framework that was developed primarily in
the Title VII employment discrimination context.94 At the first step of
the framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of a
disparate outcome for a protected group.95 This requires the plaintiff
to identify the specific conduct or policy that led to the disparate outcome. Once a plaintiff has established the disparate outcome and the
cause of the outcome, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that there was a business justification for the conduct or policy
that led to the disparity.96 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff
to demonstrate whether there was a less discriminatory way to
achieve that same goal.
In spite of the formally coherent structure of a disparate impact
claim, there is significant disagreement over the philosophical foundations of the doctrine and over whether the case law and regulatory
actions are consistent with those foundations. One of the most important disagreements is over the extent to which disparate impact
tected characteristic. Moreover, for many years geographical lines were so strongly
associated with racial divisions that it seemed natural for litigants to consider geographical criteria as being close to racial criteria. See generally Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 41 (1998).
94. Disparate impact first entered U.S. law in the 1971 breakthrough case Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., in which hiring requirements of a high school diploma and an aptitude test were challenged. 401 U.S. 424, 431–32, 436 (1971). A formal burden shifting framework was articulated in the subsequent employment decision Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, and this was articulated into the three-step burden-shifting approach that is applied today. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). This burden-shifting framework was formalized into the language of Title VII in § 703(k), added by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Similar language exists in HUD’s 2013 Disparate Impact Rule. See,
e.g., HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); Regulation B, 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.6 n.2 (discussing the relevance of Title VII for interpreting fair lending disparate impact); see also Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,870, 29,874 (July
20, 1976) (“Congress intended certain judicial decisions enunciating this ‘effects test’
from the employment area to be applied in the credit area.”).
95. See Albermarle Paper Co, 422 U.S. at 425.
96. A central question in this context is what type of business justification can
be considered legitimate. See Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision
Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII Disparate Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2019) (providing a detailed discussion of this burdenshifting framework in the context of employment discrimination).
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is meant to address cases that are more about effect than intent.97
According to one theory, which I call the “intent-based” theory, disparate impact treats unjustified discriminatory effects as a proxy for
the true concern of interest, which is the discriminatory intent.98
This account emphasizes disparate impact’s ability to unearth cases
in which there is a discriminatory motive that is hard to prove.99
A second theory of the disparate impact doctrine is that disparate outcomes are a concern in of themselves and the doctrine should
be understood as an attempt to “dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of whether anything like intentional discrimination is present.”100 This second theory has also characterized disparate impact
as “disturbing in itself, in the sense that a practice that produces such
97. For an articulation of these disagreements see Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 520 (2003). There
are other debates around disparate impact, or “indirect discrimination,” a similar
doctrine in Europe and many other countries. See generally Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L.
REV. 67 (2018) (discussing the extent to which disparate impact represents a moral
wrong or should be considered discrimination altogether).
98. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 708 (2006) (tracing the origins and implementation of disparate impact in
the context of Title VII to argue that it may have limited a more expansive theory of
intent under disparate treatment theory); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566 (2019) (discussing this theory in the
context of voting discrimination).
99. See Primus, supra note 97, at 518 (discussing the view that “disparate impact doctrine is an evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of intentional discrimination” in the context of Title VII). Another distinction that is often
made, primarily in the context of the Equal Protect Clause, is between legal scholars
who argue that discrimination law is meant to target arbitrary misclassification of
individuals (“anti-classification”) and scholars who assert that discrimination law
targets practices that disadvantage groups or perpetuate disadvantage (“antisubordination”). See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9 (2003). Balkin and
Siegel’s primary focus is on the Equal Protection Clause, however, they point out that
an anti-classification reading of Title VII disparate impact would view the doctrine as
primarily concerned with implicit disparate treatment. Id. at 22.
100. Primus, supra note 97, at 518. Primus provides a more detailed discussion of
the different possible motives of Title VII disparate impact. See id. at 518–36; see also
Stephanopoulos, supra note 98, at 1604 (discussing the view that the purpose of the
disparate impact doctrine is to improve the position of minorities by “preventing
their existing disadvantages from spreading into new areas, and ultimately to undermine the racial hierarchies of American society.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate
Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1132 (2016); Richard Primus, The
Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1352 (2010) (“Disparate impact
doctrine was widely understood as a means of redressing unjust but persistent racial
disadvantage in the workplace . . . .”).
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an impact helps entrench something like a caste system.”101 On this
theory of disparate impact, which I call the “effect-based” theory, intent is irrelevant for more than just evidentiary reasons.102
Under both theories, the need to establish causal connections
between “policies” and “outcomes” is at the heart of disparate impact. Under either theory, the plaintiff must establish a causal link
between the policy and disparate outcome to make a prima facie
claim of disparate impact.103 The stringency of this requirement determines how broad or limited a disparate impact claim can be.
101. Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH. 449, 506
(2019).
102. Despite the large conceptual difference between intent-based and effectbased theories of disparate impact, many cases are somewhat consistent with both
understandings of the doctrine. See Bagenstos, supra note 100 (arguing that Griggs is
consistent with both understandings of disparate impact). In the context of fair lending, disparate impact cases have been vague when arguing that loan officer discretion
leads to higher rates for minority borrowers. See Ian Ayres, Gary Klein & Jeffrey West,
The Rise and (Potential) Fall of Disparate Impact Lending Litigation, in EVIDENCE AND
INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 231 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds.,
2017). Schwemm and Taren argue that these cases may be considered hybrid impact/intention cases. See Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 406
n.171 (2010). The conduct being scrutinized is discretion provided to brokers (arguably a neutral practice), but discretion may allow brokers to intentionally discriminate against minorities. See id. For a discussion of how disparate impact’s limited effect in practice is linked to its difficulty to relate to employer “fault,” see Michael
Selmi, Indirect Discrimination and the Anti-Discrimination Mandate, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 257 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds.,
2013). See also Robert Bartlett, Adair Morse, Nancy Wallace & Richard Stanton, Algorithmic Discrimination and Input Accountability Under the Civil Rights Acts 19 (Aug. 1,
2020) (unpublished article) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3674665 [https://perma.cc/4K45-82MB] (discussing the “business justification”).
103. According to the HUD rules implementing the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, the “plaintiff has the burden of proving that a challenged practice causes a discriminatory effect.” Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,469 (2013); see also Policy Statement
on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,269 (Apr. 15, 1994) (“The existence of
a disparate impact may be established through review of how a particular practice,
policy or standard operates with respect to those who are affected by it.”). The Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, emphasized the causality requirement:
[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if
the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that
disparity . . . . A plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or
produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot
make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519,
541 (2015). For a discussion of whether and how Inclusive Communities differs from
the HUD joint policy, see Schwemm, supra note 90. Similarly, for the OCC to find that
credit score meets can be justified by a business necessity the variable causing the
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The emphasis on establishing these causal connections reflects
the centrality of input scrutiny for both disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment is concerned with the direct conditioning on a protected characteristic, thereby scrutinizing whether
a protected characteristic was an input to the decision. Disparate impact, despite its name, is also concerned with the inputs into a decision. Although the prima facie case requires an analysis of the effects
or outcomes of a policy, the focus quickly shifts to what inputs created the disparity and whether they relate to a legitimate business justification.104
To return to the two categories of biased inputs, does the use of
“biased world” or “biased measurement” inputs trigger discrimination law? On one account, the use of bias inputs should not trigger
the doctrine of disparate treatment because there is no direct conditioning on a protected characteristic.105 Similarly, the use of biased
inputs should not give rise to a claim of disparate impact because
“biased world” inputs are not a result of any actions on the part of
the mortgage originator and will continue to exist regardless of its
actions.106 However, the effect-based theory of disparate impact may
be wary of the use of “biased world” inputs if they entrench and
compound existing disadvantage. Under either approach, we may be
concerned when a biased input highly correlates with a protected
characteristic that it becomes a “proxy” for the characteristic.107
The use of “biased measurement” inputs arguably gives rise to
more liability on the part of the lender. This is because the lender
may have a choice as to how to measure an underlying characteristic
or may be able to exert effort to avoid biased measurement. For example, a lender could create a procedure for verifying income from

disparity must have “an understandable relationship to an individual applicant’s creditworthiness.” Westreich & Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 175.
104. See Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. at 524 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
557, 577 (2009)) (“[A] plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”).
105. See supra Part I.C (distinguishing disparate treatment, which involves direct
conditioning, from disparate impact, in which a facially neutral rule has an impermissible disparate effect).
106. This may depend on the interpretation of the business justification. If a
lender used biased inputs to predict willingness-to-pay, and this type of prediction is
not a legitimate business justification, then the conduct could trigger discrimination
law. Typically, the prediction of default as the basis for pricing is the least controversial of the business justifications a lender can provide.
107. See infra Part III.
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multiple employers and sources, and measure income that is less
consistent or formal.108
However, both legal scholars and the law overstate lenders’ ability to choose between “biased measurement” inputs and “biased
world” inputs. As discussed above, many inputs are a hybrid of both
biased world and biased measurement.109 A further issue relates to
what is reasonable to expect from a lender in avoiding measurement
bias inputs. As mentioned above, credit scores are likely to be a biased measurement of credit worthiness because they focus on certain behaviors that signal creditworthiness and not others, such as
timely rental payments.110 It seems unreasonable to expect a lender
to collect all the information a credit bureau would collect along with
other consumer payment behaviors in order to address the issue of
biased measurement.
In Part III, I discuss current positions on how to apply discrimination law to an algorithmic context given the challenge of biased inputs. I analyze three positions that represent a range of views on
how to understand the role and definition of discrimination law. I
begin by discussing the approach of excluding protected characteristics. This approach has been argued as sufficient to negate a discrimination claim, both disparate treatment and disparate impact, according to the intent-based theory of disparate impact.111 I end my
discussion with approaches that further exclude inputs that correlate
with protected characteristics, in line with the effects-based theory
of disparate impact.112
In conclusion, although there is often agreement that fair lending law covers both the disparate treatment and disparate impact
doctrines, there is disagreement on the theoretical basis and the
boundaries of disparate impact. These disagreements have implications for the legality of using biased inputs, an issue that will become
more pronounced in the algorithmic context, as discussed in the next
Part.113
108. The use of a “biased measurement” input may also reflect discriminatory
intent. Once a lender faces a choice in the way they define and measure a variable, a
lender’s intention may come into play. This Article does not fully address the issue of
a lender who disguises their discriminatory intent through algorithmic decisionmaking. For further discussion of this type of discrimination see Kleinberg et al., supra note 85.
109. See supra note 102.
110. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part III.A.
112. See infra Parts III.B & III.C.
113. In his article, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, Richard
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II. THE CHANGING WORLD OF CREDIT LENDING
Credit pricing is moving away from a process that relies on few
variables and involves human discretion in setting the final terms to
a world in which big data and machine learning are used instead.
This is likely to change the ways in which we determine whether a
pricing method amounts to “disparate treatment” or whether it
causes “disparate impact.”
I begin this Part by describing the changes taking place in the
context of credit pricing.114 I then present the central methodology of
this Article, which is a simulation exercise in which a hypothetical
lender uses machine learning to price credit.115 Building on the simulation exercise, the Part ends by discussing what those changes mean
for pricing based on biased inputs and for the application of fair
lending law.116 My conclusion is that algorithmic pricing could, in
some cases, exacerbate the problem of biased inputs but, in other
cases, mitigate the harm.
A. WHAT IS CHANGING?
Changes in how people receive credit are related to the larger
revolution brought on by the Fintech industry, a term used to describe the segment of financial services characterized by digital innovations and technology-enabled business model innovations.117 In
this Article, I focus on technology-driven changes in the pricing of
credit.118 I discuss three aspects of artificial intelligence (AI) that are
reshaping the personalization of credit pricing, namely the use of
non-traditional data, advanced prediction technologies, and automated lending decisions.119 Many lenders have incorporated a verPrimus further discusses how case law and statutory language do not fully support
any one theory of disparate impact. See Primus, supra note 97, at 518–36 (“As one
might expect from a doctrine with polyglot origins, no single theory makes sense of
all of the data. The statutory text is sketchy, and the cases speak in more than one
voice.”).
114. See infra Part II.A
115. See infra Part II.B.
116. See infra Part II.C.
117. “Fintech” covers a large range of financial activity, including payment and
trading systems, and not just the use of technology to automate credit approval and
pricing.
118. There are many ways in which artificial intelligence can assist with the process of lending in ways that are separate from their prediction of credit worthiness.
For example, AI can help with organizing and reading paperwork, which is especially
onerous in the case of a mortgage.
119. In analyzing the changes in credit pricing and their implications, a central
question that arises concerns the baseline for the comparison. One can consider a
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sion of all three trends, while other lenders have only partially
adopted some of these changes.
There are an increasing number of Fintech companies that act as
alternative credit providers to traditional lenders. These alternative
lenders operate in several domains, including mortgages, auto
loans,120 credit card lending, and personal loans.121 In addition, many
traditional lenders are using the services of third parties that engage
in alternative ways of predicting creditworthiness and pricing credit.122
The Fintech market share in borrowing services is significant
and increasing. According to one estimate, 82% of lenders report us-

range of credit pricing, from human decision-making to machine learning. For some
of my analysis, the focus is on the move from similar empirical methods, like linear
regression pricing, to machine learning pricing. When discussing changes in human
discretion in setting the terms, I primarily focus on the change from the loan officer
pricing to machine-learning pricing.
120. See Becky Yerak, AI Helps Auto-Loan Company Handle Industry’s Trickiest
Turn, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ai-helps-auto-loan
-company-handle-industrys-trickiest-turn-11546516801 [https://perma.cc/37GM
-FPM3] (using 2,700 characteristics instead of the few it was using before). Other
companies have embraced this type of lending, for example, Synchrony Financial and
Ford Motor Credit Co. Id.
121. For example, Upstart uses education and other academic variables to set the
price of credit, based on the idea that these variables measure propensity to pay that
may not be reflected in characteristics like FICO scores. See UPSTART, https://www
.upstart.com [https://perma.cc/TH5E-69Z8]. Another company, Lendbuzz, targets
populations that may not have easy access to credit, such as foreign students who are
less likely to have US credit histories. See LENDBUZZ, https://lendbuzz.com
[https://perma.cc/PPV3-RVX7]. The alternative lender, Crest Financial, for example,
uses the software of DataRobot for underwriting decisions. See Alyssa Schroer, AI and
the Bottom Line: 20 Examples of Artificial Intelligence in Finance, BUILT IN (July 30,
2021),
https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/ai-finance-banking-applications
-companies [https://perma.cc/2G6W-LRXY].
122. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Shopping at Discount Stores Could Help Get You a
Loan, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/use-a-landline-that
-could-help-you-get-a-loan-from-discover-11551695400 [https://perma.cc/W4LU
-P4GM]; see also UNDERWRITE.AI, https://www.underwrite.ai [https://perma.cc/4Q6S
-5SCW]; KreditTech, STARTUS, https://www.startus.cc/company/kreditech [https://
perma.cc/PP7R-73DZ] (“100% of smartphone or computer owners generate data by
anything they do with that device (be it social media, surfing, ecommerce purchases,
financial transactions, etc.). Our proprietary algorithm factors in 20,000 data points,
which are constantly changing based on newly identified patterns.”) (quoting the financial services KreditTech offered before it went out of business); Tom Groenfeldt,
Lenddo Creates Credit Scores Using Social Media, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2015/01/29/lenddo-creates-credit-scores-using
-social-media [https://perma.cc/L78C-H2JC] (“Lenddo is finding a lot of interest in
its lending application from outside of banking.”).
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ing nontraditional and alternative data in lending decisions.123 The
segment of the lending sector that relies on machine learning and big
data is also likely to increase over time. A recent survey by Fannie
Mae found that 27% of mortgage originators currently use machine
learning and artificial intelligence in their origination process,
whereas 58% of mortgage originators expect to adopt the technology
within two years.124
1. Nontraditional Data
The first change taking place in the world of credit is the expansion of credit decision “inputs” to nontraditional data. Whereas traditional lending relied on relatively few defined characteristics, lenders
are increasingly using new data and additional borrower characteristics to assess creditworthiness. Among them are data on payment
and consumer behavior, social media behavior, and digital footprints,125 as well as information on education, such as the school attended and degree attained,126 and GPA and SAT scores.127 Such educational information intuitively relates to a borrower’s future income
and is particularly valuable for young borrowers who have yet to

123. See Alternative Data Across the Loan Life Cycle: How FinTech and Other Lenders Use It and Why, AITE 11 (2018), https://www.experian.com/assets/consumer
-information/reports/Experian_Aite_AltDataReport_Final_120418.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/PJ2D-CDEC]; see also Stability Implications from FinTech: Supervisory and
Regulatory Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention, FIN. STABILITY BD. 35 (2017),
https://
www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BXT4-LM8U]
(“Innovations in financial services are applying rapidly evolving technologies in new
ways and leveraging different business models. New technologies include big data,
artificial intelligence, machine learning, cloud computing and biometrics.”).
124. See Mortgage Lender Sentiment Survey: How Will Artificial Intelligence Shape
Mortgage Lending, FANNIE MAE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fanniemae.com/sites/
g/files/koqyhd191/files/migrated-files/resources/file/research/mlss/pdf/mlss
-artificial-intelligence-100418.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLF3-2V33]. It is important to
keep in mind that this is the utilization of AI in all aspects of the process, not only risk
assessment. For example, use of AI to enhance consumer experience.
125. See Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling
Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183 (Feb. 21, 2017), for a definition
of traditional data. See also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 162–68, for a useful
overview of some of the non-traditional data sources. The use of non-traditional data
is also taking place in other domains in which algorithms are used to make decisions.
See Kim, supra note 5, at 861 (employment decisions context).
126. See supra note 121.
127. See, e.g., UPSTART, https://www.upstart.com [https://perma.cc/C64E-7DVY].
This is information that was is typically not considered in credit scoring, such as FICO
scores. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 156.

2022]

INPUT FALLACY

1207

build up a credit history and who typically have difficulty obtaining
certain types of loans.128
Credit scores have traditionally only used loan payments to
large and established financial institutions to determine creditworthiness.129 But now, lenders are increasingly using information on
timely payment of utility bills and rent payments as indicators of
creditworthiness for people without credit history.130 Similarly, data
on phone bills and short-term loans, which were often not included
in credit files, are now used by Fintech lenders.131 Companies with
rich information on consumer behavior, such as Alibaba, are using
this information to create alternative credit scores.132
Consumer behaviors discernable at the time the loan is requested are also being used in pricing credit. For example, a recent paper
looks at the use of “digital footprint” data, such as the device and operating system used by the consumer when using a furniture purchasing website, to determine creditworthiness.133 These digital
footprints predict default slightly better than traditional credit bureau scores, suggesting that the digital footprints hold information
128. In some cases, traditional credit rating agencies, recognizing the problem
that many people do not have adequate credit histories, have begun to develop their
own alternative credit files. FICO Expansion, for example, considers debit data and
utility data among other types of data. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra, note 5 at 166.
129. See, e.g., id. at 156 (describing how FICO principally considers loan payment
history, among other factors in determining creditworthiness).
130. See supra note 31. Credit bureaus are becoming increasingly aware of this
problem and so solutions, such as Experian’s RentBureau, allow consumers to incorporate information about rent payment history into their credit file. This indicates
that non-traditional data may, over time, be incorporated into traditional metrics.
131. See Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma,
107 GEO. L.J. 235, 267 (2019) (explaining that fintech lenders collect cellphone records for insight into customers); Alternative Data Across the Loan Life Cycle: How
FinTech and Other Lenders Use It and Why, supra note 123, at 8 (explaining that
Fintech lenders use data on short-term installment loans to make lending decisions).
132. Sesame Credit, developed by Alipay, uses big data to monitor people’s buying habits and social circles. See, e.g., John Gapper, Alibaba’s Social Credit Rating Is a
Risky Game, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/99165d7a1646-11e8
-9376-4a6390addb44 [https://perma.cc/3SMT-LZS6]. PayU, developed by LazyPay,
also develops its own model including customer interaction with apps and spending
behaviors to determine creditworthiness. See Nikhar Aggarwal, Here’s How PayU Leverages Data Science to Manage Customer’s Credit Line, ETCIO (Dec. 24, 2020),
https://cio.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/next-gen-technologies/heres-how
-payu-leverages-data-science-to-manage-customers-credit-line/79933707
[https://perma.cc/876K-EBJD].
133. See Tobias Berg, Valentin Burg, Ana Gombovic & Manju Puri, On the Rise of
FinTechs: Credit Scoring Using Digital Footprints, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 2845, 2850
(2019).
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that is not contained in credit scores.134 The use of these types of data may be particularly valuable for short-term lenders and consumer
websites that offer “ship-first pay-later,” creating a quasi short-term
loan.135
Fintech lenders are also using social media to price credit and to
verify borrower information. Although social media data might not
intuitively seem related to creditworthiness, third parties are using
this information to provide lenders with alternative or additional data on borrowers.136 Social media data can also be used to verify borrower information.
The use of nontraditional data not only contains the potential
for more accurate creditworthiness predictions but also may allow
for the expansion of credit to populations that have traditionally
been excluded from credit markets.137 In the United States, 11% of
adults have no credit record at all whereas an additional 8.3% have
thin credit records that deem them “unscorable,”138 so any lending
that requires such a score will automatically not be accessible to
nearly one-fifth of the population. The use of nontraditional datasets
would give more people access to credit.139

134. See id. at 2868. The combination of the digital footprints with traditional bureau scores provided the most accurate prediction. This suggests that digital footprints and traditional scores are complements rather than substitutes.
135. For example, Afterpay allows shoppers to pay in four installments with zero
interest. See How It Works, AFTERPAY, https://www.afterpay.com/how-it-works
[https://perma.cc/V7HQ-ELGZ]. Klarna offers payment in installments or payment in
30 days with zero interest or 6–36-month financing. See How It Works, KLARNA,
https://www.klarna.com/us/what-is-klarna [https://perma.cc/FC38-S2R5].
136. See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 131, at 265 (describing how data used for
loans “emerges from a diffuse proliferation of websites, social media, and various
genres of news sources and databases”); see also Rose Eveleth, Credit Scores Could
Soon Get Even Creepier and More Biased, VICE (Jun. 13, 2019), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/zmpgp9/credit-scores-could-soon-get-even-creepier-and-more-biased
[https://perma.cc/ZF63-SRA4].
137. See Van Loo, supra note 23, at 254 (2018) (concluding that fintechs could
expand access to credit through new data sources and other innovations for assessing creditworthiness).
138. See CFPB Off. of Rsch., supra note 48, at 6 (“As of 2010, 26 million consumers
in the United States were credit invisible, representing about 11 percent of the adult
population. An additional 19 million consumers, or 8.3 percent of the adult population, had credit records that were treated as unscorable by a commercially available
credit scoring model. These records were about evenly split between those that were
unscored because of an insufficient credit history (9.9 million) and because of a lack
of recent history (9.6 million).”); see also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 155.
139. See also Bruckner, supra note 5, at 18.
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2. Advanced Prediction Technologies
Traditional credit pricing uses simple models for differentiating
among people in terms of their default risk, as discussed in Part I. In
recent years, credit pricing increasingly uses more complex prediction methods, such as machine learning, that allow for more accurate
default prediction. These advanced prediction technologies can be
differentiated from more traditional types of credit scoring in which
the weight that various variables receive is determined at the outset.140 In the case of machine learning, the algorithm itself determines which inputs to use and what weights to assign them in reaching an accurate prediction.141
The increased use of nontraditional data and machine learning
are closely related to one another. This is because the use of nontraditional data increases the number of characteristics used to predict
creditworthiness, and neither traditional prediction techniques nor
human decision-makers are well-suited for high-dimensional data, a
term used to describe data that contain many characteristics.142
Moreover, when characteristics do not bear an immediate and intuitive relation to the outcome of interest, it is difficult to determine
which model to use in relating inputs to outcomes.143 Machine learning is optimal for this setting because it is designed to overcome difficulties in high-dimensional data and uses nonintuitive correlations
to form accurate predictions.144
The increase in prediction accuracy comes at a price of lower interpretability. Because machine learning algorithms are set up to optimize prediction accuracy and not to produce a meaningful model of
how inputs relate to outcomes, the algorithm outputs are not always
easy to interpret. This issue has received considerable attention in
both academic and policy circles and has been the motivation behind
140. In the case of FICO scores, the “model assigns a numeric value for each of
these five variables, and then applies a pre-determined weight (in percentage terms)
to each of these input values and averages them to arrive at a final credit score.” See
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 162.
141. For example, Zest AI uses machine-learning to predict creditworthiness by
providing modeling services that utilize the data already held by lenders. In approving personal loans, it helps lenders use information from the loan application process
to identify individuals who are likely not to pay back the loan. In that sense, it is using
a different prediction technology but more traditional data. See ZESTAI, https://zest.ai
[https://perma.cc/K3HU-HDNF].
142. See GARETH JAMES, DANIELA WITTEN, TREVOR HASTIE & ROBERT TIBSHIRANI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING 239 (2013).
143. See id. at 27.
144. See id. at 238.
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legislation that attempts to mitigate the harms that stem from uninterpretable algorithms.145
3. Automation
Another important trend in credit lending is the automation of
credit pricing—meaning the reduction of human involvement and
discretion in setting prices.146 In an automated context, once the
characteristics of the borrower and loan are set, the price of credit is
automatically determined by some function or algorithm. This is a
significant departure from some categories of traditional lending,
particularly larger loans such as mortgages, which typically involved
a broker and employee who would meet face-to-face with borrowers
to determine the exact terms of the loan. Although these loans included a formulaic or automated aspect,147 the ultimate loan terms
could not be known unless a borrower completed the application
process.
Automation can offer several benefits. First, it may allow for a
more efficient process of pricing and approving loans and a greater
ability to adjust to changes in lending markets.148 In addition, it may
avoid errors in human judgment with respect to evaluating creditworthiness.149 Typically, the literature refers to algorithms as “black
boxes” and opaque.150 However, it is harder to imagine a decisionmaking process that is more of a “black box” than human decision145. See discussions on the right to an explanation in Lillian Edwards & Michael
Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a Right to an Explanation Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 65–67 (2017); Lilian Edwards &
Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation” to a “Right to
Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 46 (2018).
146. See, e.g., Rocket Mortgage from Quicken Loans, which uses a complete endto-end online mortgage application and approval process. ROCKET MORTGAGE,
https://www.rocketmortgage.com [https://perma.cc/RK46-64CM].
147. For example, credit scores typically use some sort of algorithm to determine
creditworthiness. Credit scores can either be used as a dimension used to price credit
or the only determinant of credit price. In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
typically used some type of algorithm to determine the price at which they purchase
mortgages.
148. See Andreas Fuster, Matthew Plosser, Philipp Schnabl & James Vickery, The
Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1854, 1895 (2019) (describing how technological diffusion will speed up mortgage origination and lead to
more efficient refinancing decisions).
149. A recent paper demonstrates how loan officers that have discretion may
make worse decisions when busy, for example. See Dennis Campbell, Maria Loumioti
& Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, Making Sense of Soft Information: Interpretation Bias
and Loan Quality, 68 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1 (2019).
150. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015).
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making.151 Automation brings an added level of transparency, which
provides important regulatory opportunities, as discussed in Part IV.
B. SIMULATION EXERCISE – HYPOTHETICAL “NEW WORLD” CREDIT LENDER
To consider the implications of these changes on credit pricing, I
use a hypothetical “new world” lender. This lender takes data on past
loans and their performance to predict the default risk of new borrowers. The lender then uses the predicted default risk to price credit. For example, the lender may determine that people above a certain risk of default will pay a higher interest rate on the loan. This
hypothetical lender is a “new world” lender because it uses past loan
information to form predictions using machine learning.152
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate how advanced
algorithms change lending decision-making and whether current approaches to discrimination law in the new context are likely to be effective. This methodology, which Jann Spiess and I first developed in
“Big Data and Discrimination,”153 allows for a meaningful analysis of
the legal and methodological challenges in analyzing algorithmic decision rules in a stylized setting.
My hypothetical lender uses loan information reported by mortgage lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)154 to
predict credit worthiness. Specifically, I use the Boston Fed HMDA
dataset to which I add simulated default rates. Details on the Boston
Fed HMDA dataset and the model I use to simulate default rates can
be found in Appendix A.155
The prediction of loan default as a function of individual characteristics of the loan applicant from the training sample is made either
by using a “random forest,” in which the machine learning algorithm
makes the prediction using decision trees,156 or a “lasso regression,”
another common machine learning algorithm in which the algorithm

151. See, e.g., Aaron Chou, What’s in the Black Box: Balancing Financial Inclusion
and Privacy in Digital Consumer Lending, 69 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2020).
152. New lenders or lenders seeking to improve predictions might rely on third
parties that collect information on consumer and payment behaviors.
153. See generally Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36 (using a simulation exercise
based on real-world mortgage data to illustrate the authors’ arguments).
154. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1).
155. Although these default rates are based on real-world data, because they are
simulated, any figures and numerical examples in this Article that show default rates
should not be seen as reflecting real-world observations.
156. See Leo Breiman, Random Forests, 45 MACHINE LEARNING 5, 6 (2001) (defining “random forests”).
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selects the variables it deems most important for the prediction.157
The algorithm is trained on a sample of 2000 clients, with more than
40 variables each (many of which are categorical, taking on a fixed
number of possible values).158 This function can then be applied to
new borrowers, which is a subset of borrowers from the HMDA dataset not used to train the algorithm.

Figure 1: Distribution of predicted risk. The graph shows the distribution
risk for all borrowers in the holdout set of 2,000 borrowers. The graph is
cutoff at 10%, meaning that only borrowers with a default risk of less than
10% are plotted. The vertical line is the median borrower (of the full sample, not just the borrowers with a risk below 10%).

At the first stage I run a random forest algorithm on my training
data, and then apply the resulting model to a new set of borrowers.
In Figure 1, the model’s prediction function is applied to a holdout
set, meaning a subset of 2,000 borrowers that is drawn from the
same distribution but was not used to train the prediction function.
In the real world, this is likely to be a group of new applicants for
157. The objective of the lasso is to minimize the sum of squares between the
true outcome and predicted outcome (like a linear regression), subject to regularization that restricts the magnitude of coefficients.
158. The 40 variables include more types of variables than mortgage originators
typically use in setting the “par-rate” in traditional lending, though it does not include
many of the nontraditional data discussed above in Part II.A.1 due to data limitations.
For a full description of the variables in the Boston Fed HMDA dataset see Munnell et
al., supra note 77.
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which the lender is deciding whether to extend a loan and at what
price. Borrowers who are to the left of the distribution have a lower
probability of default. When credit pricing is based on default probability, these borrowers will pay a lower interest rate for a loan because they are less likely to default.159 Borrowers who fall on the
right side of the distribution are more likely to default and therefore
will pay a higher interest rate.160
The algorithm used to plot Figure 1 was race blind in the sense
that it did not use the variable “race” to form its prediction.161 However, the holdout dataset to which the prediction is applied does contain a “race” variable. We can therefore separately plot the default
distribution for white and non-white and Hispanic applicants (“minority applicants”). Figure 2 shows the default distribution for white
applicants (on the left) and minority applicants (on the right).

Figure 2: Distribution of default risk for white (W) and minority (M) applicants. Both graphs are cut off at 10% default risk. The vertical line plots the
median default risk for the full sample.

159. See Phillips, supra note 69 (“[Lenders believe] a riskier customer should pay
higher prices in order to compensate for the higher probability of default and the associated cost to the lender”).
160. I emphasize the use of default risk as a way to set the price of the loan. But
the default risk could also be used to decide who to approve for a loan altogether. A
lender might have a cutoff for lending altogether so that applicants who are predicted
to default above a threshold default probability will be denied a loan altogether.
161. Throughout most of this Article, I consider a lender who does not use the
variable “race” in forming a prediction. This is simply because a lender who does not
have a clear intention to discriminate is unlikely to use this variable. Below, in Part
III.A, I discuss the exclusion of a protected characteristic in more detail.
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Figure 2 shows that the default distribution is further to the left
for white borrowers, reflecting that a higher proportion of white
borrowers are low risk. This can also be seen by the vertical line, signifying the median applicant, which is further to the left for the white
applicants than for the minority applicants. This simulation of an algorithmic lender will be used in the next part to demonstrate how
this type of pricing changes how consumers are differentiated. In
Part III, I will use this simulation to demonstrate the shortcomings of
current approaches to algorithmic discrimination.
C. WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES IN THE ALGORITHMIC CONTEXT?
It is important to understand how biased inputs affect credit
pricing decisions. Although the problem of biased inputs is not new
to the algorithmic context, its consequences may be different in the
traditional and algorithmic setting.
On the one hand, algorithmic pricing could exacerbate the “biased world” problem because it increases the variance in predictions
and may expand the number of “biased world” inputs through its use
of nontraditional data.162 Algorithmic pricing also allows for a greater ability to recover protected characteristics, as will be discussed in
detail in Part III.163 On the other hand, the algorithmic context could
mitigate the harms of “biased measurement” by providing an increased amount of information on individuals.164
1. Biased World Inputs in Algorithmic Pricing
The first way in which the move to the new world of credit pricing can increase the disparities between protected groups is by
broadening input variables to include additional “biased world” inputs. This is the change that receives the most attention in the media
and in legal writing.165 If algorithmic credit pricing differentiates be162. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the “biased world” problem).
163. This has drawn significant scholarly and policy attention. See, e.g., Hurley &
Adebayo, supra note 5 (discussing algorithmic pricing, its problems, and proposing
policy solutions).
164. See id. at 151–52 (explaining that some commentators argue that the increased amount of information about individuals in the complex algorithms companies use actually benefit underserved consumers).
165. See Jennifer Miller, Is an Algorithm Less Racist Than a Loan Officer?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/business/digital
-mortgages.html [https://perma.cc/2TAU-326C] (“[B]roadening the data set could
introduce more bias.”); Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1670 (2019) (describing how new input variables such as educa-
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tween people along dimensions that correlate with race, then clearly
the outcome disparities will increase.166
Another way in which machine learning pricing can increase the
disparities of credit prices is through the greater ability of machine
learning to personalize prices. The flexibility of the machine learning
regression means that in forming predictions, the algorithm can better distinguish between individuals, thus creating more granular
predictions. Differences among individuals are then more likely to
translate into greater differences in predicted outcomes than would
be true with other less flexible prediction technologies, such as a linear regression.167 Accordingly, even small differences between individuals could translate into greater gaps between the price for credit
paid by white and non-white borrowers. One way to describe the increase in price personalization is through the variance of the distribution. A higher variance in the default probability means that people are more spread out in terms of the price they pay for credit,
creating a greater range of predictions.
To consider how machine learning can increase price variance, I
compare a simple function using just a few variables with a machine
learning algorithm that uses many variables. For the simple prediction function, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to
predict default with a small subset of the variables available in the
Boston Fed HMDA dataset.168 For the machine learning prediction, I
tion-based data may increase disparities in credit lending).
166. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 167 (describing Facebook’s proposed
credit-scoring tool as an example of how algorithmic pricing may perpetuate or even
intensify existing biases). Another concern is that as the number of inputs increases,
so will the number of inaccurate inputs. See Yu et al., supra note 84, at 4 (“Expanding
the number of data points also introduces the risk that inaccuracies will play a greater role in determining creditworthiness.”); see also Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem &
Glenn B. Canner, Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, 90 FED. RES. BULL. 297
(2004) (examining the possible effects of data limitations in consumer credit reports,
including inaccuracies, on consumers). In general, the accuracy of the data used to
price credit (and score consumers) is highly regulated. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 and Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
167. It is not clear that an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is the right
comparison here since the typical “old world” pricing method relied on human discretion and perhaps human discretion is a more flexible prediction than some machine-learning regressions. However, the par-rate set by the mortgage originator is
likely to rely on a function closer to an OLS regression if not more basic (such as default means within bins).
168. See Munnell et al., supra note 77, at 28–30 (discussing the variables used in
the Boston Fed HMDA dataset). The four variables used for this example are: “housingdti” (housing expenses relative to income), “totaldti” (total debt payment obliga-

1216

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[106:1175

use a random forest with the full set of HMDA variables, other than
“race.” Therefore, the simple function and the machine learning function differ along two dimensions: the number of variables and the
prediction technology.

Figure 3: Increase of spread with machine learning. For the graph on the
left, an OLS regression was used to predict default with the indepent variables “housingdti,” “totaldti,” “fixedadjustable,” “loanterm.” The prediction
function was then applied to a “hold out” set. The graphs show the distribution of predicted default probabilities. For the graphs on the right, a random
forest algorithm was used to predict default using all variables in the Boston
Fed HMDA dataset, other than race. The prediction function was then applied to the same holdout set as the OLS prediction. The graph on the right
shows the distribution of predicted default probabilities. The vertical lines
are the mean default predictions, and the horizontal bars are the standard
errors. Together, the mean and standard errors demonstrate the “spread” of
the prediction.

Comparing the two distributions in Figure 3 demonstrates how
the use of a machine learning algorithm leads to borrowers being
more spread out. This reflects the fact that the machine learning algorithm’s predictions have higher variance than the simple regression. That is, the price of credit is more personalized. The greater
variance of the random forest prediction, represented by the wider
horizontal bar, is the combined effect of the use of more inputs and a
more flexible prediction technology.169
tions relative to income), “fixedadjustable” (fixed or adjustable loan term), and “loanterm” (length of loan term).
169. In reality, these two effects are also likely to be combined because, when
confronted with big data, classic regression analysis leads to overfitting—
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The increased variance of the random forest prediction has implications for racial disparities even though Figure 3 does not directly measure these disparities. When new credit pricing uses new data
sources in which there are large differences between people who belong and do not belong to protected groups, the use of machine
learning could translate the differences in inputs into larger outcome
disparities. For example, if male and female borrowers are different
with respect to inputs that predict default, a more flexible prediction
technology can increase the differences in predicted default for men
and women.
The ultimate welfare implications of increased personalization
are unclear in the real world.170 As will be discussed in further detail
below, the more accurate prediction may allow certain groups previously denied credit altogether to now receive credit. Because of the
ability to estimate their risk more accurately, a lender may agree to
extend credit to groups that were previously completely excluded
from credit markets, albeit at a higher price than to safer borrowers.171
2. Biased Measurement Inputs in Algorithmic Pricing
Many of the concerns of the effects of big data and machine
learning credit pricing discussed in the context of biased world also
apply to variables that reflect biased measurement. The added variables and the increased flexibility that follow from the use of machine
learning can increase the credit pricing disparities.172
At the same time, the use of big data and advance prediction
technologies can also lead to decreased reliance on a biased proxy.
constructing a model that corresponds so closely to the data at hand that it is unable
to make meaningful predictions in other samples. Big data and machine learning
therefore often go hand in hand. It is also important to keep in mind that both graphs
do not use the type of nontraditional data that real-world algorithmic lenders are using, so that these graphs are understating the extent to which algorithmic pricing will
increase variance.
170. Fuster et al., supra note 65 (manuscript at 3–6) (explaining that the authors’
theoretical work does not employ the exact same variables and machine learning that
real-world lenders use, implying that studies like this cannot exactly replicate the
effects of increased personalization in lending algorithms in the real world).
171. See id. (manuscript at 6) (explaining the authors’ finding that the machine
learning model is predicted to provide an increase in number of borrowers access to
credit, marginally reducing disparity in acceptance rates across race and ethnic
groups, but also predicted increased interest rate disparity across the different
groups, with Black and Hispanic borrowers’ interest rates increasing).
172. See generally Odinet, supra note 165 at 1674–80 (explaining that newly added variables to credit pricing algorithms can increase credit pricing disparities).
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For example, FICO scores may be biased because they reflect creditworthiness as measured by past mortgage payments but not timely
rental payments, which are more prevalent for minorities.173 If big
data provides lenders with the opportunity to use rental payment
data in addition to FICO scores, this can reduce the differences in
predicted default. The use of algorithmic credit pricing could thus
decrease rather than increase disparity.
There is empirical evidence that the use of nontraditional data
leads to decreased reliance on FICO scores. A recent paper written by
researchers at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve found that the correlation between the credit ratings of LendingClub,174 a Fintech lender,
and FICO scores has decreased over time, due to LendingClub’s increased use of nontraditional data.175 This evidence is consistent
with the idea that the use of nontraditional data reduces the impact
of the measurement bias of FICO scores.176
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has also recently
discussed the potential benefit of alternative data and machine learning in expanding credit. Based on the finding that an algorithmic
lender’s model “approves 27% more applicants than the traditional
173. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 162 (explaining that the basic FICO
score only considers an individual’s loan and credit “payment history, outstanding
debt, length of credit history, pursuit of new credit, and debt-to-credit ratio in determining credit score”).
174. These ratings are called “rating grades” and are determined by LendingClub.
Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the LendingClub Consumer Platform, 48 FIN.
MGMT. 1009, 1010 (2019).
175. See id. (“Our results demonstrate that the correlation between the borrowers’ FICO scores . . . and the rating grades assigned by LendingClub have dramatically
declined over the years indicating an increased usage of alternative data in the internal rating process.”).
176. See id. (explaining this decrease in correlation between LendingClub rating
grades and FICO scores can be explained, in part, by LendingClub’s use of nontraditional data, including utility or rent payments, other recurring transactions, electronic records of deposit and withdrawal transactions, insurance claims, credit card
transactions, a consumer’s occupation or details about their education, their use of
mobile phones and related activities, internet footprints, online shopping habits, and
investment choices). There is also evidence that cash-flow data can more accurately
assess creditworthiness than credit scores, and in some cases act as a supplement for
credit scores. See The Use of Cash-Flow Data in Underwriting Credit: Empirical Research Findings, supra note 26, at 3 (“[C]ash-flow variables and scores tested were
predictive of credit risk and loan performance across the heterogenous set of providers, populations, and products studied. Standing alone, the cash-flow metrics generally performed as well as traditional credit scores, which suggests that cash-flow variables and scores can provide meaningful predictive power among populations and
products similar to those studied where traditional credit history is not available or
reliable.”).
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model, and yields 16% lower average APRs for approved loans,” it
concluded that “some consumers who now cannot obtain favorably
priced credit may see increased credit access or lower borrowing
costs” as a result of the use of nontraditional data.177
The conclusion is that it is difficult to assess at the outset the exact consequences of the widespread changes occurring in the world
of credit pricing. The use of advance prediction technologies means
that only inputs that contribute to prediction accuracy are considered in pricing. Because algorithms are better able to differentiate
among people, biased world inputs might further increase disparities. At the same time, the expansion of input data might undo some
of the harm of measurement bias. The fact that the use of algorithmic
pricing might either increase or decrease disparities relative to classic credit pricing suggests that only experimentation or empirical investigation can determine the direction of the effect. This will be further explored in Part IV.
III. APPROACHES TO ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION
The changes taking place in the landscape of credit pricing could
have far-reaching implications for how fair lending law applies to the
algorithmic setting. In this Part, I focus on the principal approaches
of how to apply discrimination law to the algorithmic context, including approaches of legal academics and policy makers, along with
proposed regulation. Some of these approaches have not developed
primarily with credit pricing in mind but are highly relevant to fair
lending.
Disagreements over the scope and boundaries of discrimination
law in the non-algorithmic context, discussed in Section I.C, carry into the new world. For the intent-based theory of disparate impact,
the focus is primarily on whether a lender uses a protected characteristic in pricing, even when this occurs in a facially neutral way.178
For the effect-based theory of disparate impact, the concern will be
whether algorithmic credit pricing exacerbates or entrenches disadvantage.179 The specific interpretation of the burden-shifting framework may be informed by these theories, such as the stringency ap177. Patrice Alexander Ficklin & Paul Watkins, An Update on Credit Access and the
Bureau’s First No-Action Letter, CFPB (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance
.gov/about-us/blog/update-credit-access-and-no-action-letter
[https://perma.cc/
TD8G-PXAE].
178. See generally supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the intentbased theory of disparate impact).
179. See generally supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing the effectbased theory of disparate impact).
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plied to the initial burden on the plaintiff and how narrowly to construe the “business justification.”
Although I cover a wide range of approaches that are based on
different interpretations of the doctrine, a common thread is their
outdated focus on input scrutiny. In focusing chiefly on what goes into the algorithm (“inputs”), these approaches follow the logic of traditional discrimination law. But in doing so, they commit a fallacy for
three reasons. First, they often fail on their own terms by not fulfilling their own loose definition of fairness. Second, they sometimes
resist practical implementation and are unsuitable for the machine
learning setting. Finally, they risk restricting access to credit for vulnerable populations and further entrench disadvantage.
I analyze three approaches, summarized in Table 1.180 The first
approach excludes protected characteristics as inputs, primarily as a
method for negating a claim of intentional discrimination under the
“disparate treatment” doctrine.181 The second approach expands the
exclusion of inputs to proxies for protected characteristics.182 This
approach recognizes that other inputs may act as “proxies” for protected characteristics and argues that proxies should be excluded
too. The last approach I discuss restricts algorithm inputs to only
preapproved inputs.183 It thus differs from the first two approaches,
which allow all inputs other than certain forbidden inputs.
The primary fallacy of these approaches is that they continue to
scrutinize decision inputs, as traditional fair lending did, even though
this strategy is no longer effective in the algorithmic context. At the
heart of traditional fair lending lay a paradigm of causality that has
become outdated in the algorithmic age: Disparate treatment centered on the question of whether a protected characteristic had a
causal effect on a credit decision. Disparate impact required plaintiffs
to show a causal connection between disparities and a policy.184 A
defendant could then negate a claim of discrimination by showing
180. One approach I do not explicitly discuss is the approach of modifying input
data. See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1424 (2019) (arguing that we should modify the information algorithms are fed). These approaches often lack an articulation of the criteria
they are meant to fulfill, making them difficult to judge. Moreover, they often focus on
modifying the algorithm’s training data which does not address problems that stem
from actual population differences when the algorithm is applied. See id. at 1394 (arguing that modification should encode or shape training data).
181. See infra Part III.A.
182. See infra Part III.B.
183. See infra Part III.C.
184. See MacCarthy, supra note 97, at 81.
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that a policy had a causal relationship to a legitimate business interest.185
Machine learning, however, is a world of correlation and not
causation. When we use a machine learning algorithm to predict an
outcome, the focus is on the accuracy of the prediction, and that accuracy is the metric by which the success of the algorithm is judged.
Therefore, effective approaches to discrimination law in the algorithmic setting cannot rely on traditional causal analysis.
Table 1: Summary of approaches
Approach

What is the
approach
trying to
achieve?
No direct
consideration of race

Can the
approach be
implemented?
Yes

Excluding
proxies for
protected
characteristic (Section
III.B)

No consideration of
race through
proxies

Difficulty in
defining and
identifying
proxies

Restricting
inputs to
preapproved
characteristics
(Section
III.C)

No consideration or
race through
proxies (and
possibly
avoid large
impermissible disparities)

Challenging
to determine
which inputs
are permissible

Excluding
protected
characteristic (Section
III.A)

Is the
approach
effective?
Algorithm
can use protected characteristics
regardless
(recovery of
protected
characteristics)
Algorithm
can recover
protected
characteristic better
than classic
proxies (like
zip codes)
Classic inputs can
continue to
serve as
proxies

Is the
approach
otherwise
undesirable?
Exclusion of
protected
characteristic can increase disparities

—

The selectio
n of preapproved
variables
could entren
ch disadvantage.
High cost to
prediction
accuracy.

185. See id. (“However, an employer can defend itself by showing that this policy
or practice was based on reasonable factors other than age; they do not have to prove
that this reasonable business practice had less impact on older workers than other
possible alternatives.”).
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A. EXCLUDING PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS
One approach to addressing the concerns highlighted in Part I is
to require that algorithms not consider a protected characteristic directly by excluding the characteristic as an input. This means that
prior to running the algorithm on the training set, a lender would exclude any protected characteristics from the inputs of the algorithm,
even if they were available to the lender. Formally, the prediction is
blind to a borrower’s protected characteristic, because any two people who are identical except for the input “race” for example, would
have the same predicted default probability.186
The requirement to exclude protected characteristics is mainly
discussed in the context of the disparate treatment doctrine. Disparate treatment focuses on the intentional discrimination or the direct
classification on the basis of a protected characteristic.187 Therefore,
the requirement that an algorithm exclude a protected characteristic
is seen as akin to avoiding the classification on the basis of a protected characteristic.188
186. See Kleinberg et al., supra note 85, at 27 (“[T]he algorithm might be engaging
in disparate treatment—as, for example, if it considers race or gender and disadvantaged protected groups (perhaps because racial or gender characteristics turned out
to be relevant to the prediction problem it is attempting to solve).”); see also Sunstein, supra note 101 at 507 (“Importantly, the algorithm is made blind to race.
Whether a defendant is African American or Hispanic is not one of the factors that it
considers in assessing flight risk.”). For discussion in the context of employment discrimination, see Sullivan, supra note 5, at 405. In Sullivan’s motivating example, “Arti”
is an algorithm who determines whom to employ: “Arti doesn’t have any ‘motives’
which seems to mean that its using a prohibited criterion to select good employees
can’t be said to violate Title VII’s disparate treatment prohibition.” Id. at 405. Ultimately Sullivan argues that Title VII is primarily concerned with the causal connection between a protected characteristic and a decision, and “motivation” is one way
to establish causality. See id.
187. See generally Kleinberg et al., supra note 85, at 21–22 (describing examples
of disparate treatment).
188. This assumed translation between inclusions of a protected characteristic
and “discriminatory intent” is not obvious. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory
Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1242–63 (2018) for a discussion of the various interpretations of discriminatory intent in the context of the Equal Protection Doctrine.
Discriminatory intent has been interpreted as “motivation” and “animus,” which are
human attributes and seem less relevant for algorithms. See id. at 1222, 1242 (describing motivation and animus as interpretations of discriminatory intent). The basis for attributing discriminatory intent to an algorithm is more appropriate under an
“anticlassification” understanding of intent, like that articulated by Huq. See id. at
1251–57 (describing the “anticlassification” understanding of discriminatory intent).
In the algorithmic setting the mainstream position seems to be that disparate treatment would require the exclusions of protected characteristics. See generally Kleinberg et al., supra note 85, at 21–22 (describing examples of disparate treatment
which require exclusions of protected characteristics). For a related discussion of
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What is particularly appealing about the exclusion approach is
that in the automated setting, protected characteristics can formally
be excluded. In the human decision-making context, by contrast, such
formal exclusion is often not possible because the human has observed the protected characteristic, such as race. This has been a major challenge for discrimination law, as it is difficult to plausibly
show that an observed characteristic was not taken into account.189
In the context of algorithmic decision-making, companies can guarantee the formal exclusion of protected characteristics when they define or delineate the features used by an algorithm. Enforcement of
the prohibition is also more feasible as long as there is some documentation of the inputs used by the algorithm.
But despite the intuitive appeal of this approach, as I will argue
in this Section, it is ineffective in guaranteeing that a protected characteristic is not used to form a decision. Moreover, this approach
might lead to undesirable outcomes, particularly if we also care
about the disparities created by a pricing algorithm.
1. Ineffective Exclusion
Information about a person’s protected characteristic is embedded in other information about the individual, meaning that a protected characteristic can be “known” to an algorithm even when formally excluded. The ubiquity of correlations in big data combined
with the flexibility of machine learning means it is much likelier that
an algorithm can recover protected characteristics. It is hard for the
human eye to disentangle these correlations and interactions between variables to identify when an algorithm is actually using a protected characteristic. Particularly with the use of nontraditional data,
much more can be inferred about a person’s protected characteristic,
such as their gender, age, and race.
The approach of excluding protected characteristics implicitly
assumes that an algorithm might want to use a protected characteristic in forming a prediction. It assumes, in other words, that a prowhether statistical discrimination violates the Equal Protection Doctrine, see Crystal
S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and Legal
Framework, 119 MICH. L. REV. 291, 301–22 (2020).
189. See Kleinberg et al., supra note 85, at 16 (arguing that a major challenge for
discrimination law has always been detecting and establishing illicit motivations).
The problem is deeper than a mere evidentiary barrier in establishing discriminatory
intent, given that people might suffer from implicit bias and are unaware of how a
protected characteristic shapes their decision. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias’s Failure, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 37 (2018) (describing how implicit
bias is unconscious bias individuals are unaware of).
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tected characteristic could be empirically relevant, in that it could
provide information on default probability. In this respect, the use of
an algorithm alleviates at least the concern over the arbitrary use of
protected characteristics, because an algorithm would not consider a
protected characteristic unless it had informational value.
However, the empirical relevance of a protected characteristic
for an accurate prediction is also precisely what gives rise to the concern that an algorithm can still discover a protected characteristic,
even after its exclusion. This concern gets at the difficulty of using a
statistical technology that is focused on empirical accuracy, while
complying with legal restrictions that go beyond empirical relevance.
For example, the ECOA prohibits pricing on the basis of gender regardless of whether gender is of empirical relevance to default prediction.190
One reason an algorithm would consider a protected characteristic is that the characteristic correlates with some other unobservable characteristic that is of true interest.191 In such a case, the protected characteristic is not of interest in and of itself. Rather, it
correlates with other factors that are related to the outcome that are
imperfectly observed by the algorithm. For example, an algorithm
may use “race” in predicting an outcome because it correlates with
other characteristics that the algorithm cannot observe directly, such
as wealth or access to credit, which in turn affect default risk.192
Economists often describe this situation as “statistical discrimination” because race is used to infer other information.193
190. ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
191. It is not possible to perfectly establish whether a characteristic is what I call
“causal” or not of an outcome. The point I wish to make is that protected characteristics may be predictive because of the underlying relationship to the target and not
because they act as proxies.
192. This example closely relates to the category of proxy discrimination that
Prince and Schwarcz call “Indirect Proxy Discrimination.” See Anya E. R. Prince &
Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1279–81 (2020) (“[P]roxy discrimination will tend to occur
when a suspect variable is predictive of a desired outcome only because it proxies for
another, quantifiable and potentially available, variable that causes the desired outcome but that is not included in the AI’s training data.”).
193. Statistical discrimination is the use of protected characteristics to form accurate beliefs about unobservable characteristics. See generally Edmund S. Phelps,
The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972) (describing
statistical discrimination); Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination (Princeton
Univ., Indus. Rels. Section, Working Paper No. 30A, 1973) (describing statistical discrimination in the labor context). There is more nuance to the types of correlations
that an algorithm might want to discover than is presented here. See generally Prince
& Schwarcz, supra note 192 (providing other examples of types of correlations an
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Legally, “statistical discrimination” is likely to be prohibited by
fair lending’s disparate treatment doctrine.194 The direct conditioning on a protected characteristic, even if it merely serves as a proxy
for another characteristic, nonetheless leads to different pricing for
protected groups. And the fact that there is empirical support for using the protected characteristic, in that its use increases prediction
accuracy, would not serve as a defense.195 Protected characteristics
are also sometimes of direct interest. When a protected characteristic is causally or closely related to the outcome of interest, an algorithm has a direct interest in recovering the characteristic.196 The
protected characteristic is not substituting for an unobservable variable. In these cases, the wedge between what is empirically relevant
and legally permissible is the greatest.
Discrimination law often prohibits consideration of a characteristic that is of direct empirical relevance.197 In the case of ECOA, the
Act prohibits discrimination on grounds that are possibly causal of
default.198 ECOA prohibits discrimination based on age and based on
whether a borrower receives his or her income from public assistance programs, as discussed above.199 It is plausible that these two
factors affect a borrower’s predicted future income and therefore
algorithm may want to discover); Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness,
106 VA. L. REV. 811, 820–28 (2020) (discussing other examples of correlations algorithms attempt to discover including sickness and recidivism).
194. See generally Kleinberg et al., supra note 85 (describing disparate treatment
doctrine). This may not be true under the interpretation of “discriminatory intent”
that is concerned primarily with animus and not with classification. For a discussion
of the different types of discriminatory intent in the context of Equal Protection, see
Huq, supra note 188, at 1249.
195. See supra Part I.C.
196. This is closely related to what is often referred to as “rational discrimination,” which often comes up in the context of disability insurance. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accomodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
197. See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 192, at 1281 (discussing the example of
health insurance and genetic information). Clearly, genetic information is highly relevant to the cost of insuring an individual, and yet the insurer is forbidden from considering this information.
198. Although not the mainstream view of ECOA, there is an interpretation that
ECOA is only really meant to address “arbitrary” consideration of these factors. See
Taylor, supra note 42. For an economics perspective on this type of discrimination,
see J. Aislinn Bohren, Kareem Haggag, Alex Imas & Devin G. Pope, Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 25,935, 2020), proposing a new category of discrimination: “inaccurate
statistical discrimination,” which is a type of statistical discrimination that is based
on inaccurate beliefs.
199. See supra Part I.C.
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closely relate to default risk. Yet, ECOA prohibits their consideration.
Similarly, ECOA prohibits discrimination based on marital status,
although this too could affect the likelihood of default when a mortgage is underwater.200
Other protected characteristics, such as gender and race, may
also have a direct empirical relation to default risk, causing further
schism between empirical accuracy and normative limitations. For
example, it might be rational for a lender to consider race and gender
when estimating future income assuming there is labor market discrimination against women and racial minorities.201 If information
about race and gender is available to an algorithm, an optimized
prediction of default is likely to consider these protected characteristics. This would be true whether or not the protected characteristic is
provided directly as an input.
To demonstrate the ability to recover a protected characteristic
from other information, I use the Boston Fed HMDA dataset to predict two protected characteristics, “age” and “marital status.” Each
time, I exclude the protected characteristic while predicting this
characteristic from the remaining variables.

200. There are examples in other domains of discrimination law prohibiting the
consideration of causal characteristics. For example, many states prohibit the consideration of gender in setting life and health insurance premiums. See Ronen Avraham,
Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (2014). Another important example are laws that prohibit discrimination of costs of annuities based on gender, such as the EU Directive on insurance pricing. See Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 373) (EC) (covering
insurance in general and not only annuities). A person’s gender will highly affect the
costs of providing an annuity, given that women often live longer than men.
201. See generally David Neumark, Experimental Research on Labor Market Discrimination, 56 J. ECON. LITERATURE 799 (2018).
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Figure 4: ROC curve for prediction of borrower “age.” The “age” variable in
the Boston Fed HMDA dataset is not a continuous variable of age but rather
an indicator of whether the applicant’s age is above or below the median in
the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area. The ROC curve plots the truepositive-rate and false-negative-rate for different cut-off rules. The number
in the lower right corner is the Area Under Curve (AUC).

Figure 4 demonstrates the ability to predict “age” with a high
level of accuracy from the other HMDA dataset variables. Figure 12
in Appendix B shows similar analysis for predicting “marital status”
from the other HMDA variables. The two figures are a representation
of how accurately I was able to predict a borrower’s age and marital
status from the HMDA dataset in the form of a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve. The number on the bottom right corner is
the Area(s) Under Curve (AUC), which measures the prediction accuracy. Appendix B provides more details on how the ROC curve is
plotted and how it should be interpreted. Intuitively, because the
ROC curves are close to the upper left corner, and the AUC are high
(0.84 for age and 0.9 for marital status), we are able to predict these
protected characteristics with a high level of accuracy.202
202. In fact, these results are a lower bound of what is feasible with big data and
machine learning. As discussed, the variables in the Boston Fed HMDA dataset are
primarily more traditional pricing variables and the data are therefore not as rich as
those likely available to algorithmic lenders. See Munnell et al., supra note 77. With
nontraditional data, lenders might recover protected characteristics with even greater accuracy.
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My prediction shows that the formal exclusion of a protected
characteristic may be meaningless with respect to the ability of an
algorithm to actually use the characteristics. Even if an algorithm
does not seek to recover the information—that is, even if it never
tries to derive race or marital status—such characteristics are available to it because they are so embedded in the rest of the data.
The ability to recover a protected characteristic from other information may arguably be less of a concern when the characteristic
only serves as a proxy for true characteristics of interest. This is because the protected characteristic was never of interest in and of itself, and therefore a “blind” algorithm will search for proxies of the
underlying characteristics of interest rather than attempt to recover
the protected characteristic. Moreover, as the data scope and accuracy increase, there is no need to use protected characteristics, even if
the algorithm was not “blind.”
The concern is likely to be much greater when considering protected characteristics of direct interest. In the case of a protected
characteristic that is of direct interest, changes in data scope and accuracy may only mean that algorithms will have a better ability to
learn and use a protected characteristic, even when formally hidden.
The wedge between what is empirically relevant and legally permissible never disappears. Eventually this could mean that there is no
difference between a “blind” and “aware” algorithm, rendering the
exclusion strategy meaningless.
The gap between what is empirically relevant and what is normatively relevant suggests a blurring of the distinction between antidiscrimination law and affirmative action.203 If two people with different default risks, because they are of a different age or gender, are
forced to be treated equally, there is potentially a cross-subsidization
from one group (mid-aged or male borrowers) to another group
(older or female lenders).204

203. See Strauss, supra note 28. In this context, I refer to affirmative action as
forcing equal treatment of borrowers with different risk profiles. However, affirmative action is much broader than this example.
204. This blurring of the lines is similar to arguments advanced with respect to
the similar functioning of discrimination law and “reasonable accommodations” in
the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 697 (2001). Here, however, I argue
that this form of affirmative action is a result of disparate treatment and the barring
of direct conditioning on a protected characteristic and not necessarily disparate impacts.
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2. Disparities May Increase with Exclusion
There is an additional reason to be wary of the exclusion of protected characteristics as a way to apply discrimination law in the algorithmic setting. Namely, if we care about price disparities, the inclusion of a protected characteristic, rather than the exclusion, could
decrease disparities.205
When a characteristic should be interpreted differently for various racial groups, excluding “race” could increase disparities. This is
because by excluding the race variable, we are imposing a similar interpretation of a characteristic for both white and non-white applicants. When there are many more whites in a training dataset, which
is likely to be the case even in a representative dataset,206 the prediction will be formed according to the weight attributed to the characteristics for whites. For example, even if the borrower’s number of
children is predictive of default only for white applicants and not
non-white applicants, the algorithm will give the characteristic the
same weight for all racial groups when “race” is excluded. This critique is consistent with the growing skepticism among scholars
about the usefulness of the wholesale approach of excluding protected characteristics.207
Similarly, the inclusion of protected characteristics may also be
important in mitigating the harms of “biased measurement” variables. Consider a hypothetical lender that predicts default from an input that suffers from measurement bias. In this example, “ability” is
205. The extent to which disparate impacts are concerned in directly reducing
outcome disparities is discussed above in Part I.B, and may depend on what type of
reason is driving the disparities created by exclusion.
206. In the 2000 HMDA dataset, for example, Black applicants are less than ten
percent of all applications reported. See Nationwide Summary Statistics for 2000
HMDA Data, Fact Sheet, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (FFIEC) tbl.2 (2001),
https://www.ffiec.gov/hmcrpr/hm00table2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF4U-7HPH]. It’s
important to note that the Boston HMDA is skewed to overrepresent minorities relative to their share amongst mortgage applicants.
207. See also Kim, supra note 5, at 904. (“Thus, a blanket prohibition on the explicit use of race or other prohibited characteristics does not avoid, and may even
worsen, the discriminatory impact of relying on a data model.”); Melissa Hamilton,
The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on Hispanics, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1553 (2019) (considering the performance of the COMPAS risk assessment on Hispanics); Melissa Hamilton, The Sexist Algorithm, 37 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 145 (2019) (discussing with respect to COMPAS and gender); Alice Xiang, Reconciling Legal and
Technical Approaches to Algorithmic Bias, 88 TENN. L. REV. 3, 24 (2021) (discussing
COMPAS and the case State v. Loomis where the court found it compelling to include
gender to promote accuracy). See generally Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ashesh Rambachan, Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AEA PAPERS AND PROC. 22
(2018).
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equally distributed across the population and higher “ability” people
default less, perhaps because their earnings are higher.208 The characteristic “ability” is not observed by the lender. Instead, the lender
has information about college attendance, which is correlated with
“ability.” Assume that racial minorities face discrimination in college
applications and are therefore less likely to attend college. In this example, the input “college attendance” suffers from measurement bias
because it is a noisier measurement of “ability” for racial minorities.

Figure 5: Simulated example of default risk using a “race blind” algorithm
(on the left) and a “race aware” algorithm (on the right). The graphs plot the
distribution risk for white (W) and minority (M) borrowers using an OLS
regression.

Figure 5 shows that in my simulated example, predicting default
risk only from college attendance results in non-white borrowers
having a higher default probability.209 This can be seen in the graph
to the left in which the distribution for non-white and Hispanic borrowers (“M”) is shifted to the right, meaning there are more borrowers with a higher default risk. When default prediction includes the
race variable (graph on the right), the default risk of white and nonwhite is more similar. This is because a race-aware algorithm knows
to treat “college attendance” differently for white versus non-white
borrowers.

208. This could be because higher ability borrowers are likely to have higher future earnings, and therefore have a lower risk prediction.
209. This example uses an OLS regression and not a machine learning algorithm.
For the purposes of this highly stylized example, the OLS regression is sufficient.
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The conclusion is not that including protected characteristics
always reduces disparity. In fact, this is unlikely to be true when a
protected characteristic has a direct relationship to the outcome of
interest.210 Rather, the argument is that it is difficult to determine a
priori what effect the inclusion of a protected characteristic might
have. Therefore, we should be wary of treating the exclusion of protected characteristics as a reliable means of reducing disparity.
It is questionable whether the inclusion of a protected characteristic for the purpose of reducing disparities would be legal. As discussed above, many approaches to discrimination and algorithms assume that protected characteristics must be excluded.211 Recently,
however, several scholars have suggested that discrimination law’s
position on the consideration of a protected characteristic may be
more nuanced.212
B. EXCLUDING PROXIES FOR PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS
A second approach to applying discrimination law to algorithmic pricing expands the prohibited inputs to also include “proxies”
for protected characteristics. The discussion in the previous Section
demonstrates that the exclusion of a protected characteristic may be
meaningless if an algorithm can use proxies for that characteristic.213
If there are proxies for a protected characteristic, a natural response
is to exclude these proxies as well. This second strategy can therefore be thought of as an expansion of the first strategy. In traditional
210. In Part II.B above, I present a case in which the lasso regression puts weight
on the input “race,” predicting that white borrowers are less likely to default.
211. See MacCarthy, supra note 97, at 73 (“These cases do suggest that the use of
group variables in algorithms would be subject to strict scrutiny, even if their purpose is to reduce group disparities.”).
212. Deborah Hellman, for instance, argues that separately considering which
inputs are predictive of future criminal activity may not in fact constitute disparate
treatment. See Hellman, supra note 193, at 854.
In general, the fact that the explicit consideration of a protected characteristic
can reduce disparities suggests a possible tension between disparate treatment and
disparate impact. The tension between the requirement to ignore forbidden characteristics and the requirement to assure that policies do not create a disparate impact,
thereby requiring a consideration of people’s forbidden characteristics, has recently
been debated. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (indicating that a promotion test was invalidated by an employer because of the concern that promotion
based on the test would trigger disparate impact); see also Hellman, supra note 193,
at 822; Kim, supra note 5, at 925; Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal, 108 GEO. L.J. 803, 809 (2020) (“Voluntary algorithmic affirmative action ought to
survive a disparate treatment challenge under Ricci and under the anti-race-norming
provision of Title VII.”). See generally Primus, supra note 97.
213. See supra Part III.A.
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fair lending, this strategy is sometimes adopted by excluding salient
examples of proxies, such as zip codes.214
Several scholars have proposed preventing algorithms from using variables that are highly correlated with a protected characteristic.215 For example, Hurley and Adebayo propose a model bill—the
Fairness and Transparency in Credit Scoring Act—that contains this
type of provision.216 The model bill requires that credit scores “not
treat as significant any data points or combinations of data points
that are highly correlated to immutable characteristics.”217 This approach was also articulated by HUD in its proposed rule on disparate
impact, in a section related to algorithmic credit decisions. According
to the proposed rule, a defendant can negate a claim’s disparate impact by showing that a risk assessment algorithm excludes proxies
for protected characteristics.218
1. What Is a “Proxy”?
The expansion of input exclusion, beyond protected characteristics themselves, requires a clear articulation of the criteria for exclusion. Prior work has suggested that a proxy be defined as an input
that is (1) highly correlated with the protected characteristic,219
214. The use of a zip code in credit pricing could also trigger a claim of “redlining,” in which a lender avoids extending credit to borrowers who live in neighborhoods with higher minority populations. See Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1136 (2017) (discussing
redlining).
215. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5.
216. See id. at 196.
217. Id. at 206. The “immutable characteristics” that the provision is referring to
are race, color, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, and age. There is a similar
provision for marital status, religious beliefs, or political affiliations. See id. at 190.
218. Section 100.500 (c)(2) of HUD’s proposed disparate impact rule relates to a
case in which a plaintiff is challenging a defendant’s use of a model with a discriminatory effect and lays out the defenses on which a defendant can rely. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
42,854 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100), supra note 11.
According to § 100.500(c)(2)(iii), a defendant can rebut a claim of discrimination by
showing that “none of the factors used in the algorithm rely in any material part on
factors which are substitutes or close proxies for protected classes under the Fair
Housing Act.” See id. Ultimately, the Final Rule did not include the proposed provisions on algorithmic decisions, however HUD has not yet provided any alternative
guidance on the topic.
219. See Charles River Assocs., Evaluating the Fair Lending Risk of Credit Scoring
Models, CRA INSIGHTS: FIN. ECON. 1, 3 (2014), https://media.crai.com/sites/default/
files/publications/FE-Insights-Fair-lending-risk-credit-scoring-models-0214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6S56-LHAM] (“Ostensibly neutral variables that predict credit risk
may nevertheless present disparate impact risk on a prohibited basis if they are so
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and/or (2) does not contain informational value beyond its use as a
proxy.220 Hurley and Adebayo focus on variables that highly correlate with protected characteristics.221 Other approaches require
something beyond a correlation, such as requiring that the variable
does not contain much information relevant to the outcome of interest.
Identifying characteristics that contain little or no informational
value beyond their use as a substitute for a protected characteristic222 is difficult to implement in practice. The problem is that we do
not have a good understanding of the “model” of default, nor of the
variables that are causal of default. Even if we knew the true model
of default, we would not necessarily know how other variables relate
to those causal variables. In some cases, intuition is used to replace
empirical understanding of how variables relate to default, by attempting to tell a plausible story of whether an input that correlates
with race does or does not contain information related to default,
beyond its use as a proxy.223 However, even zip codes, which have
become the archetype of a proxy for race, are likely to contain informational value relevant to default risk.224
highly correlated with a legally protected demographic characteristic that they effectively act as a substitute for that characteristic.”).
220. See Report to Congress Under Section 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, supra note 7. There are other approaches for the exclusion
criteria. For example, Sunstein has argued that “[d]ifficult problems are presented if
an algorithm uses a factor that is in some sense an outgrowth of discrimination.” See
Sunstein, supra note 101, at 509. In the context of credit pricing this would mean excluding many of the fundamental features used to price credit, even today, such as
credit scores and wealth.
221. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 200. (“The FaTCSA addresses the potential problem of proxy-based discrimination by prohibiting the use of models that
‘treat as significant any data points or combinations of data points that are highly
correlated’ to sensitive characteristics and affiliations.”).
222. See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 192, at 1257 (“A practice producing a disparate impact only amounts to proxy discrimination when the usefulness to the discriminator of the facially-neutral practice derives, at least in part, from the very fact
that it produces a disparate impact.”).
223. See Yu et al., supra note 84, at 28 (providing an example of this type of intuitive argument). According to the NCLC, to rely on a business necessary justification,
the lender would need to show the connection between the input and credit risk. For
example, “[t]here is an understandable connection between timely repayment of past
obligations and the likelihood of timely repayment of future obligations, so a ‘demonstrable relationship’ argument can be easily made.” See id. at 29.
224. For example, the real estate fluctuations in a particular area. See Erik Hurst,
Benjamin J. Keys, Amit Seru & Joseph Vavr, Regional Redistribution Through the US
Mortgage Market, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 2982, 2982 (2016) (documenting large regional
variation in default risk, despite the uniform pricing of Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) across regions).
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A further difficulty is that many variables can be an indicator of
a protected characteristic and also independently contain information relevant to the outcome of interest. In most cases, we are not
able to isolate the component of a variable that is merely a proxy for
a protected characteristic and the component that contains independent information.
2. Identifying Proxies
Focusing on proxies for protected characteristics defined as inputs that highly correlate with those characteristics is also unlikely
to guarantee that protected characteristics are not used by an algorithm. This is because in the big data context, considering how individual inputs correlate with protected characteristics does not fully
capture the complex interactions among inputs. Therefore, expanding the excluded characteristics to inputs that correlate with protected characteristics will only have a limited effect in reducing disparities, if any at all.
Figure 6 shows how an algorithm may produce different risk
predictions for white and non-white borrowers even when excluding
inputs that highly correlate with race.225 The graph on the left shows
the distribution of default risk for white and non-white borrowers
when the algorithm does not use “race,” and the graph on the right
shows the default risk when the algorithm excludes both “race” and
the ten variables that correlate most with “race.” One way to consider the disparities between the groups is by considering the gap between the vertical lines, which are the median predictions for white
and non-white borrowers. Although the difference in median risk
prediction for white and non-white borrowers is lower in the graph
on the right,226 the disparities between the groups continue to persist. This is because the individual correlations of variables with a
protected characteristic do not capture the full range of how variables correlate and interact.227
225. This figure is similar to the figure produced in Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36,
at 469. One important difference is that this figure does not contain a separate distribution for Black and non-white Hispanic borrowers but rather collapses them into
one category of non-white borrowers.
226. This is partially because the distributions have altogether been condensed
as a result of the use of fewer variables to distinguish between borrowers. See supra
Part II.C.1.
227. It is important to note that this demonstration is somewhat of a lower bound
of how information on protected characteristics is embedded in other inputs with big
data. As already mentioned, the number of variables and types of data used in the
simulation example are similar to more traditional credit pricing since it does not
include non-traditional data such as consumer purchasing and payment behavior.
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Figure 6: Distribution of risk predictions across groups for different inputs.
The graph on the left shows the risk predictions when using all HMDA inputs other than race, plotted separately for the non-Hispanic white (W) and
non-white (M) borrowers in the holdout group. The graph on the right
shows the risk predictions when using HMDA inputs other than race and
ten variables with the highest correlation to race. It, too, plots the predictions separately for white and non-white borrowers. The vertical lines are
the median risk prediction for each racial group. The ZCTA populations are
reweighted to account for the oversampling of Black borrowers in the Boston Fed HMDA dataset.

Furthermore, classic examples of “proxies,” such as zip codes,
may be less indicative of race than other variables used by lenders.
To demonstrate this, I consider how accurately I am able to predict
whether a borrower is Black from the Boston Fed HMDA dataset,
which contains mostly classic variables used by lenders. I then compare this to how accurately I am able to predict whether a borrower
is Black from Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs), the Census equivalent of zip codes,228 for the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area.229

When the amount of data and type of data expands, this problem is likely to be more
severe given the complex relationship between different characteristics and the
ubiquity of correlations. See supra Part II.B.
228. The reason that the Census uses ZCTAs and not zip codes is that zip codes
often cross state, county, census tract, and census block group, and therefore could
not be used as a defined area in the Census.
229. This is the geography that the HMDA dataset is based on. The populations in
the ZCTAs have been reweighted to reflect the over-sampling of Black populations in
the Boston Fed HMDA dataset. See the description of who was included in the Boston
Fed HMDA dataset in Munnell et al., supra note 77, at 26.
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Figure 7: ROC curve for prediction of “Black” using HMDA covariates and
using Census ZCTA

Figure 7 shows that the prediction of whether a borrower is
Black is more accurate using the HMDA dataset than ZCTAs. For
nearly all the distribution, the curve of the HMDA covariates is above
the Census ZCTA curve. This means that for nearly any cut-off rule
with respect to predicting whether a borrower is Black, the HMDA
covariates produce a more accurate prediction (meaning that the
“true positive rate” is higher and the “false positive rate” is lower, see
Appendix B). This can also be seen by comparing the area under a
curve for the Census ZCTA (0.86) and the HMDA covariates (0.79).
The example demonstrates how common intuitions about which variables serve as proxies might be misleading. If what we are truly interested in is the ability to recover a person’s protected characteristics, intuitive judgments are insufficient to determine which features
to exclude. Features that intuitively feel like proxies might correlate
less than features that do not feel like proxies.
The final reason to be wary of this second exclusion approach is
that most inputs used to price credit, even in the traditional context,
correlate with a protected characteristic.230 Restricting the use of
variables that correlate with protected characteristics reduces lenders’ ability to accurately predict default risk and personalize pricing
accordingly.231
230. See supra Part I.B.
231. See supra Part I.A.
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In summary, while the attempt to exclude proxies in addition to
protected characteristics is intuitively appealing, there are practical
challenges endemic to defining and detecting proxies. Correlation to
a protected characteristic does not fully capture the extent to which
variables can be used as a substitute for a protected characteristic.
Moreover, variables that correlate with race form the core of even
traditional credit pricing. Finally, input exclusion comes at the price
of prediction accuracy, which may hurt vulnerable populations.
C. RESTRICTING THE ALGORITHM TO A PREDETERMINED SET OF VARIABLES
A third approach restricts the inputs of an algorithm to inputs
that are pre-approved. It was recently proposed by Prince and
Schwarcz in the context of insurance: “[i]nstead of allowing use of
any variable not barred, as in the traditional anti-discrimination
model, this approach would only allow actors to use pre-approved
variables.”232 This third approach is similar to the first two in that it
limits the inputs into an algorithm. However, instead of focusing on
excluding variables that are impermissible, this approach seeks to
define what variables are permissible.
A related recent proposal looks to restrict algorithmic inputs to
a set of pre-vetted variables. According to Bartlett et al., algorithmic
inputs should only include variables that do not penalize protected
groups disproportionately, controlling for the variables’ predictive
relevance.233 This test, which they call the “input accountability test,”
breaks down variables into a component that predicts the target,
such as creditworthiness, and a component that does not relate to
the target (“noise”). If the noise component of the variable is correlated with a protected characteristic, it must be excluded from an algorithm’s inputs.234
Predetermining permissible variables could be implemented either by a regulator or by using an internal screening process by the
lender to decide which variables can be used. Approaches requiring
that lenders show that inputs are “relevant” or “causal” to the outcome are likely to amount to a form of predetermining permissible
inputs.235 If lenders must show that a lending decision relies on inputs that are logically related to the outcome, they will need to ex232. See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 192, at 1306.
233. See Bartlett et al., supra note 102, at 23.
234. Id. at 31.
235. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 192, at 1316 (“[O]ne possible solution is to
require those employing algorithms to convince regulators or others of causal connections between the variables utilized and the desired outcome.”).
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clude other variables. Predetermining which variables are related to
the outcome will allow lenders to meet this burden.236
1. Entrenching Disadvantage
The main challenge for the third approach is to define which
variables are permissible. That definition depends on what the restriction is meant to achieve. One version of the approach, for instance, might want to restrict the variables to only inputs that predict default. But if that is the goal, then there would be no reason to
restrict inputs at all. After all, compared to a human, the algorithm is
a better judge of whether an input predicts default.
Another version of the approach might limit the algorithm to
characteristics that are used in traditional credit pricing, such as FICO scores or a borrower’s income.237 But this would undermine the
benefits of big data and machine learning in extending access to
credit. The use of nontraditional data can expand credit to people
without sufficient credit history, so excluding this data maintains
their status as “credit invisibles.”238 Moreover, when FICO scores, for
example, only measure certain indicators of the likelihood of meeting
obligations on time, big data can mitigate this “bias measurement” by
expanding the data used to predict default. By restricting algorithms
to classic characteristics, these benefits cannot be captured, potentially entrenching disadvantage for certain populations.
An alternative version allows for the use of characteristics that
are not classic credit pricing variables but to restrict inputs to variables that are closely related to models of repayment. This is the ver236. See Westreich & Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 15 (“Where a model has a
disparate impact, our test in effect requires an employer to explain why its model is
not just a mathematically sophisticated proxy for a protected characteristic.”); see
also Kim, supra note 5, at 921 (“The existence of a statistical correlation should not be
sufficient. Instead, because the employer’s justification for using an algorithm
amounts to a claim that it actually predicts something relevant to the job, the employer should carry the burden of demonstrating that statistical bias does not plague
the underlying model.”).
Another approach which seeks to develop a pre-approval process for inputs was
recently suggested by Yang and Dobbie. Their approach is based on a statistical
method to prevent inputs that correlate with protected characteristics from serving
as proxies. See Yang & Dobbie, supra note 188.
237. See supra, Part I.A.
238. See Ficklin & Watkins, supra note 177. Fintech can potentially be used “to
address race-based financial inequality while also being attentive to the possibility
that seemingly innocuous technologies can generate biased banking practices against
minority communities.” Julia F. Hollreiser, Note, Closing the Racial Gap in Financial
Services: Balancing Algorithmic Opportunity with Legal Limitations, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 1233, 1235 (2020).
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sion advanced by Bartlett et al. who argue that in determining what
variables are legitimate, “one can write down a life-cycle model in
which cash flow for repayments emerge from the current borrowing
position (debt), cost of borrowing (credit score), income (in levels,
growth, and risk), wealth, and regular expense levels (cost of living
measures).”239 When a variable correlates with a protected characteristic, it can only be used to the extent that it relates to the lifecycle structural model of debt repayment.240 Similar to the approach
in Subsection III.B.2., the position advanced by Bartlett et al. seeks to
prevent an algorithm from using proxies for protected characteristics.
The success of this approach relies on human intuitions to accurately determine how inputs relate to the “life-cycle” model of repayment. In reality, we do not always directly observe the variables
of the structural model of repayment and rely instead on noisy substitutes for the variables of the model. With high-dimensional data
wherein correlations are ubiquitous, we can lose any direct sense of
how inputs relate to the structural model.241 For example, a person’s
wealth is typically unknown, and so in order to infer wealth, we may
need to rely on proxies or correlates of wealth. As the complexity of
the structural model and the list of inputs that can be used to infer
the variables in the structural model increase, the dependence on
human intuition in determining what variables feel related to a characteristic in the model, such as wealth, becomes particularly weak.
Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that we know the
true structural model of repayment. Structural models are useful
when engaging in empirical research and need to estimate the effect
of different changes on an outcome of interest. They also provide
discipline in interpreting empirical results. However, they are a far
cry from a true reflection of the actual causal relationships that exist
in the world. For example, the literature on micro-financing in development economics points to a number of factors that might affect default rates, not captured by Bartlett et al.’s “life-cycle” model—among
them that the public repayment of loans may lead to lower default

239. See Bartlett et al., supra note 68, at 3.
240. This articulation of the exclusion criteria is different to the one provided in
Bartlett et al., supra note 102. According to this later article, an input would be required to be excluded even if it was included in the life-cycle model as long as the residual of the prediction of default correlated with race. Id. at 31, 34.
241. Bartlett et al. avoid this problem by focusing on a context in which mortgage
lenders do not face default risk so that differential pricing cannot be explained by default prediction altogether. See Bartlett et al., supra note 68, at 15.
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rates due to reputation concerns.242 If we rely on a structural model
to dictate what can and cannot be used as an input, it is a problem
when the structural model is incomplete. This is particularly worrisome if the mode is more incomplete for protected groups.243
2. High Cost to Prediction Accuracy
More generally, limiting the inputs an algorithm can use to form
a prediction of default could lead to less accurate predictions, the
main benefit of machine learning pricing. Without such limitations,
machine learning pricing can increase accuracy for a few reasons.
First, its replacement of human prediction with an automated system
of prediction can add accuracy to the prediction.244 Second, compared to other statistical methods, such as linear regressions, machine learning allows for greater flexibility in forming a prediction,
which in turn increases accuracy.245 Finally, the expansion of the
type and number of inputs considered by an algorithm can further
increase its accuracy.246
To demonstrate how accuracy can change when reducing the
inputs of an algorithm, I return to my hypothetical lender. I compare
two algorithms, one that uses the full set of inputs (other than race)
and another that is only limited to a small subset of variables.247
242. See, e.g., Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee, Microcredit Under the Microscope: What
Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know?, 5 ANN.
REV. ECON. 487 (2013) (discussing the various theories and empirical evidence on
microlending).
243. For example, suppose creditworthiness is affected by social attitudes to
foreclosure, which are more prevalent among minority communities, but that these
social norms were not part of the structural model of repayment. In such a case, the
exclusion of this type of input may in fact increase bias.
244. See Lkhagvadorj Munkhdalai, Tsendsuren Munkhdalai, Oyun-Erdene
Namsrai, Jong Yun Lee & Keun Ho Ryu, An Empirical Comparison of Machine-Learning
Methods on Bank Client Credit Assessments, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 699 (2019) (comparing
a human-expert based model of prediction, FICO, with a machine learning prediction,
finding that the non-human expert prediction is superior in predicting default). For a
similar discussion in the context of bail decisions, see Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237 (2018).
245. See supra Part II.C.
246. Some input proposals go beyond restricting non-traditional inputs and may
also require restricting traditional credit inputs. It is unlikely, for example, that even
the traditional credit inputs would pass Bartlett et al.’s “input accountability test,” as
it imposes very strict conditions on each individual input. This would mean that under this test, credit may not be personalized at all. See Bartlett et al., supra note 102,
at 32.
247. I use one possible subset, which includes some variables that are typically
used to price credit today—income, debt-to-income ratio and characteristics of the
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Figure 8: Distribution of risk predictions. The graph on the left shows the
risk predictions using a random forest with the full set of inputs (other than
race). The graph on the right shows the risk predictions using a random
forest with a small set of more traditional credit inputs. Both graphs separate the risk prediction for non-Hispanic white borrowers (W) and nonwhite borrowers (M). The vertical lines are the median for each group of
borrowers.

Figure 8 shows that when using a smaller set of inputs, the risk
distribution changes. The risk distribution becomes more condensed
when predicting from a smaller set of inputs (graph on the right).
This is because using fewer variables means that there are fewer variables to distinguish between people so that the distribution is more
concentrated around the mean.
To demonstrate the change in prediction accuracy, I plot the receiving operator characteristic (ROC) curve corresponding to the
two distributions in Figure 8.248

loan.
248. See Appendix B (ROC curves).
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Figure 9: ROC curves corresponding to risk distributions in Figure 8. The
ROC curve on the left shows the accuracy of the risk predictions using a
random forest with the full set of inputs (other than race). The graph on the
right shows the accuracy of the risk predictions using a random forest with
a small set of more traditional credit inputs. The number on the bottom
right corner is the Area Under Curve (AUC).

Figure 9 shows that the prediction based on the larger set of inputs is more accurate. This can be seen from the curve in the left
graph being closer to the upper left corner and from the AUC in the
lower right corner being higher for the prediction using the full set of
inputs.249
The potential tradeoff between different notions of fairness and
accuracy has been previously noted and is also relevant when trying
to limit the inputs into an algorithm.250 However, as argued in the
previous Sections, the proposal to limit an algorithm to inputs that
seem intuitively relevant to the outcome of interest face further challenges, as the decision could be arbitrary and even undermine the
249. Bartlett et al.’s “input accountability test” is likely to restrict inputs much
further, possibly to the extent of prohibiting personalized credit pricing altogether. It
is questionable whether even traditional inputs would pass this test. Bartlett et al.,
supra note 102, at 31.
250. See Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 68, at 802–03; see also Geoff Pleiss, Manish Raghavan, Felix Wu, Jon Kleinberg & Kilian Q. Weinberger, On Fairness and Calibration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 2 (Ass’n for Computing Machinery ed., 2017)
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3295222.3295319 [https://perma.cc/R2FV-99G4];
Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 192, at 1306 (“[If no solution is adopted] due to narrowly-defined notions of efficiency, then it must be acknowledged that this comes at
the expense of these [anti-discrimination] laws’ goals.”).
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benefits of big data in mitigating the harm of measurement bias.
Therefore, the restriction of inputs may not even be a case of trading
off accuracy for fairness but could in fact reduce accuracy and fairness. Moreover, as discussed in Section I.A, reduced accuracy could
hurt vulnerable borrowers who are excluded altogether from credit
markets when the lender cannot accurately price risk.251
D. REQUIRED SHIFT FROM CAUSATION TO CORRELATION
Translating traditional discrimination law to the algorithmic
context requires more than the small tweaks suggested by approaches that continue to focus on credit pricing inputs and on their causal
relationship to the differential treatment of protected groups. Instead of falling prey to their input fallacy, we must recognize that in
the machine learning context, we cannot identify causal relationships.252
As discussed in Section I.C, fair lending law has traditionally focused on causal questions. Many scholars continue to apply this
causal framework to discrimination law in the algorithmic context,253
and regulators, too, continue to contemplate causal relationships.254
251. See supra Part I.A; Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice,
68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019). The need to be sensitive on who bears the burden of more
or less accurate predictions has been discussed by Huq in the context of criminal justice. Huq argues that racial equity requires considering who bears the cost of algorithmic errors in determining how to apply notions of fairness. Id. at 1111–12.
252. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006) (discussing the causation requirement in anti-discrimination laws); Foster, supra note 49, at 1472 (“The
prohibition against discrimination is a prohibition against making decisions or taking
actions on account of, or because of, a status characteristic singled out for protection
by our civil rights laws or constitutional traditions (which generally include race,
gender, nationality, religion, disability, and age).”).
253. Legal causal analysis does not rely on presenting rigorous empirical identification of causal relationships. Instead, claims of causality focused on intuitive understanding of how factors and inputs are related to the outcomes. For example, the
NCLC describes this intuitive type of argumentation: “[t]here is an understandable
connection between timely repayment of past obligations and the likelihood of timely
repayment of future obligations, so a ‘demonstrable relationship’ argument can be
easily made.” Yu et al., supra note 84 , at 29. Similar arguments have been made in the
context of employment. See Kim, supra note 5, at 881 (“If, however, the variables are
merely correlated and not causally related, there is no necessary connection between
them, and the correlation may not hold in the future.”); see also King & Mrkonich, supra note 57, at 555 (arguing law’s causal inquiry should be distinguished from a social science understanding of causality); Bartlett et al., supra note 102, at 37, 39.
254. The recently proposed HUD disparate impact rule suggests that defendants
can negate a claim of disparate impact if they “break down the model piece-by-piece
and demonstrate how each factor considered could not be the cause of the disparate
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In particular, scholars continue to maintain that disparate impact’s
“business necessity” is not met when there is a mere correlation between the features and outcome variables,255 even though correlation is in fact the only relationship identified by machine learning.
Similarly, some have argued with respect to substantiating a disparate impact claim that “there must be a nexus or causal connection between some element of institutional practices and the disparate outcome.”256
These causal relationships break down in a machine learning
world. The relationships that an algorithm uses to form a prediction
reflect correlations in the data and not a causal connection to the
outcome of interest. When an algorithm considers whether a borrower has an android phone to predict their creditworthiness, for
example, it is not telling us about the causal relationship between
phone type and default. A person who buys a new phone is unlikely
to alter their actual risk of default. Rather, the basis for an algorithm
to use a borrower’s phone type could be its correlation with a variable that is causally related to default, such as income, or some other
type of association.257
Because of the absence of identifiable causal relationships, input-based approaches are unsuitable for discrimination law in an algorithmic setting. This, we have seen, is true for both disparate
treatment and disparate impact. For disparate treatment, we have no
reliable way to detect proxies for protected characteristics. For disparate impact, we need new tools to evaluate the effects of algorithmic pricing.
IV. THE FUTURE OF FAIR LENDING
Given the unsuitability of input-based approaches, we must rethink how to analyze discrimination in the new context of algorithimpact.” HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,859 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
100). HUD’s articulation of the defense relies on the ability to isolate inputs and separately evaluate their causal relationship to a disparate outcome. Id.
255. See Westreich & Grimmelmann, supra note 57 at 170 (“We believe that
where a plaintiff has identified a disparate impact, the defendant’s burden to show a
business necessity requires it to show not just that its model’s scores are not just correlated with job performance but explain it.”).
256. See MacCarthy, supra note 97, at 84.
257. Another example is using data on the time it takes a person to fill out an
online application as predictive of default risk. See Berg et al., supra note 133, at
2894. We cannot know whether this is because it relates to a person’s protected
characteristic or not. All we know is that it is predictive.
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mic credit pricing. If we are to fight credit discrimination as fair lending requires us to—by preventing the substantively different treatment of protected groups and advancing distributional and fairness
interests—we must shift our focus to outcome analysis.
Discrimination law has always resisted focusing solely on the
outcomes or effects of a policy as a way of identifying discrimination.
However, when credibly scrutinizing inputs is not an option, downstream analysis provides important opportunities.258 This Part proposes a new framework for conducting such outcome-based analysis.
A. OUTCOME TESTING
The framework that I propose is an outcome-based test that
regulators should use to assess whether credit pricing discriminates
against protected groups in violation of fair lending law. The test applies a lender’s pricing rule to a dataset of hypothetical borrowers
and then examines the properties of the outcome. The test can therefore be split into three stages. At the first stage, the lender determines what inputs and which algorithm to use to predict default and
price accordingly.259 At the second stage, the regulator then takes
258. One possibility, not fully addressed in this paper, is that discrimination law
altogether is no longer the appropriate legal framework to address concerns in the
algorithmic context. Several academics and policy makers have argued that the
unique challenges of algorithmic fairness requires an alternative framework to discrimination, such as affirmative action. See Dwork et al., supra note 58 (proposing
“fair affirmative action”); see also Chander, supra note 50, at 1040 (proposing we deal
with unfair outcomes as a result of biased inputs through affirmative action). Huq’s
recent proposal to evaluate algorithmic criminal justice measures based on their effect on racial stratification is also an output-based framework because it looks to the
benefits and costs of the criminal justice measures. Huq, supra note 251, at 1128. For
broader discussions of the appropriateness of discrimination law, see Anna Lauren
Hoffmann, Where Fairness Fails: Data, Algorithms, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Discourse, 22 INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 900 (2019), arguing that discrimination law is an
insufficient framework to address the structural concerns that arise as a result of big
data and algorithmic decision-making.
Others have suggested that the concerns of algorithmic fairness be addressed
through creating appropriate frameworks that allow further private or public scrutiny. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 150 (discussing greater transparency as one possible approach). For skepticism over whether transparency or privacy can address
fairness concerns, see Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s
Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013).
259. What is unique about the machine-learning context is that a pricing rule exists even before specific borrowers receive loans. In traditional credit pricing, little is
known before actual prices were given to real borrowers. In the algorithmic context,
because the process is fully automated, regulators can analyze prices in an ex ante
manner, before the algorithm is applied to price credit. An alternative analysis that
the regulator could conduct would be to compare the binary decision of lenders of
whether to extend or deny a loan application. In fact, HMDA is primarily focused on
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that prediction or pricing rule and applies it to a dataset of people to
see the distribution of prices the rule produces.260 One way to think
of the dataset used by the regulator is that it represents a group of
hypothetical borrowers for which we want to learn the price this
group would be charged for a loan.261 Finally, the regulator evaluates
the outcome to determine whether the disparities created by the
pricing rule amount to discriminatory conduct.262 I use the example
of race as a protected characteristic, but the analysis is generalizable
to other protected characteristics.
The raw disparities are rarely of interest in and of themselves,
so that in the third stage of the test, the regulator needs to determine
whether disparities created by a pricing rule amount to discrimination.263 For the reasons discussed in Part III, the criteria used to deunderstanding whether this lender decision varies by race. See CFPB Home Mortgage
Disclosure Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(iii).
260. Elsewhere I have argued that it is difficult to analyze a prediction function in
the abstract. Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36, at 473–74. Rather, the prediction function
should be applied to a group of borrowers in order to examine its properties. Id. at
485. For data scientists, this is typically the holdout set, meaning a subset of the data
on which the algorithm is not trained but is instead used to assess the accuracy of the
prediction. Id. at 486. A regulator could be strategic in selecting which population to
apply a pricing rule to by not sharing the dataset with the lender in advance.
261. I focus on the possibility of the regulator applying the pricing rule to a dataset, but it is also possible to require lenders themselves to create such a test internally, which is then reported to the regulator.
262. The credit price is not the only outcome metric that is of interest to a regulator. The regulator could use a similar method to analyze a lender’s binary decision of
whether to extend a loan, focusing on analyzing disparities with respect to error
rates. Much of the algorithmic fairness literature has focused on fairness definitions
that are types of “classification parity” meaning they consider whether a measure of
classification error is equal across groups. See Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 58,
at 6 (defining this category as any measure that can be calculated from a confusion
matrix, which tabulates the joint distributions of a certain decision and outcomes by
a group); see also Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth, Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, 50 SOCIO.
METHODS & RSCH. 3 (2018). Two of these measures, the “true positive rate” (TPR) and
“false positive rate” (FPR), discussed in Appendix B, provide a way to measure the
prediction accuracy. Ancillary literature has focused on documenting how the various
classification errors often cannot simultaneously be satisfied. See Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish Raghavan, Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination
of Risk Scores, ARXIV, Sept. 19. 2016, at 2, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807
[https://perma.cc/X6DK-T2MM] ; Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153
(2017).
Some recent legal literature has also focused on these types of outcomes. See
Hellman, supra note 193; MacCarthy, supra note 97, at 91–94, 96.
263. Outcome analysis has always been a part of a disparate impact claim for the
purposes of the prima facie case but was rarely the determining factor. See, e.g., Tex.

2022]

INPUT FALLACY

1247

termine whether pricing disparities amount to discrimination needs
to be formulated without reference to the inputs used. The exact criteria to be used in outcome analysis cannot be defined without clear
definition of what discrimination law, and disparate impact in particular, is meant to achieve.
A full discussion of the different theories of discrimination, and
how to develop the closest equivalent outcome-based tests to those
theories, is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, the focus of this
Part is on demonstrating how outcome analysis can answer meaningful questions related to discrimination.
I focus on two questions that can be analyzed using outcomebased analysis. The first question is whether borrowers who are
“similarly situated” are treated the same, which would be needed to
analyze discrimination under “discrimination as anti-classification.”
Much of the definition of credit discrimination centers around the interpretation of discriminatory intent.264 One possible interpretation
of discriminatory intent may be animus towards a protected group
or “taste-based discrimination,” meaning discrimination that is based
on a prejudicial preference for one group over the other.265 While
this interpretation tracks some understandings of discriminatory intent under the Equal Protection clause266 it is unlikely to be a correct
interpretation of current fair lending law.267 A more likely interpreDep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 520
(2015). A typical disparate impact claim begins with a demonstration of outcome
disparities. This showing of disparities is rarely sufficient in and of itself, even for the
first stage of a case, since a plaintiff is also required to isolate the particular policy or
input that led to the disparity. Id. at 521 (“A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.”). Despite the role outcome analysis plays in a disparate
impact case, there is little guidance on how exactly to conduct this analysis.
264. See supra Part I.C.
265. This is how economists typically refer to discriminatory intent as animus.
Huq, supra note 188, at 1242.
266. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155,
158–59 (2019) (finding application of the animus concept to the Equal Protection
Clause and religion clauses, “suggests the flexibility and portability of the animus
concept”).
267. See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Two Final Rules to
Promote Access to Responsible, Affordable Mortgage Credit, CFPB (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial
-protection-bureau-issues-two-final-rules-promote-access-responsible-affordable
-mortgage-credit [https://perma.cc/47VM-9NZW].
If credit discrimination is limited to cases of animus, by definition a human sentiment, the use of algorithms for lending decisions is unlikely to raise a concern and
will not require scrutinizing algorithmic inputs. Huq, supra note 251, at 1088–90. As
long as the algorithm was set up to predict the correct object, such a credit risk, any
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tation of discriminatory intent is “anti-classification,” focusing on
whether a protected characteristic was a criterion for a lending decision.268 Considering whether “similarly situated” borrowers were
treated differently provides the second-best way of analyzing
whether a protected characteristic was used as a criterion when this
question cannot otherwise be answered directly.269
The second question that can be analyzed using outcome analysis is whether the pricing rule increases or decreases disparities relative to some baseline, which may be a way to analyze “discrimination
as discriminatory effect.”270 The type of incremental analysis I propose is appropriate under the position that disparate impact plays a
role beyond identifying discriminatory intent and is meant to address policies that have a discriminatory effect even when lacking intent.271 This approach recognizes the role that disparate impact plays
in balancing the benefits of accurate predictions and the business interest of lenders, with the need to prevent further disparities in credit markets, highlighted by inputs reflecting a biased world and biased
measurement. The traditional way in which disparate impact played
that role is the burden shifting framework.272 However, fair lending’s
way in which the data is used cannot be motivated by animus but by an attempt to
provide an accurate prediction. See id. at 1086–87. Thus, even the direct use of a protected characteristic in pricing would not reflect animus and therefore would not be
discriminatory. It is important to keep in mind that if the humans who design the algorithm are motivated by animus, this would trigger discrimination laws. See id. at
1089 (explaining intent could be found when “an algorithm’s designer [is] motivated
by either an animosity toward a racial group, or else a prior belief that race correlates
with criminality, and then deliberately design the algorithm on that basis”).
268. See Huq, supra note 188, at 1251; see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (discussing racial anti-classification in the context of
Brown v. Board of Education).
269. See supra Part III; see also Xiang, supra note 207, at 26 (“[A]nti-classification
masks a history of distinguishing between benign and malicious uses of protected
class attributes.”); Bent, supra note 212, at 852 (“[A]nticlassificatory ideal of colorblindness is impossible in the machine-learning context, because we cannot create
truly colorblind algorithms. Machines are too effective in identifying proxies.”).
270. See supra Part I.C.
271. See supra Part I.C. (discussing the “effects-based” theory of disparate impact).
272. As long as lenders were able to demonstrate that some disparity was the
result of a legitimate business interest, the disparities were tolerable. Susan S.
Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30
GA. L. REV. 387, 387 (1996); see Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36, at 470–71 n.35. How
broadly or narrowly the business justification was defined determines the weight
given to those business interests over the goal of reducing credit market disparities.
If the “business justification” of the disparate impact doctrine is to be taken to mean
literally any business justification, then any algorithm that increases prediction accu-
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existing burden shifting framework is unsuitable in the algorithmic
setting.273 Outcome testing provides a new set of tools to functionally
perform the same kind of balancing of policy goals.
1. Comparing Borrowers Who Are Similarly Situated
An important question for discrimination law is whether borrowers who are similarly situated are treated the same.274 In traditional disparate impact cases, this is required as part of the prima facie case. Discrimination law has long recognized that there are
differences that are a legitimate basis on which to distinguish between borrowers.275 Despite the significance of the definition of who
is “similarly situated” under traditional fair lending, there is little
guidance on this question.276
racy arguably meets the threshold of the justification.
273. See Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36, at 462.
274. This requirement originates in the seminal Title VII case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Some courts were willing to extend the “McDonnell Douglas standard” to the credit context. See Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to
Mortgage Lending Discrimination Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 329 (1995) (summarizing fair lending cases and the requirement for the plaintiff to establish that “the
defendant approved loans for white applicants with qualifications similar to the
plaintiff’s”); see also Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (5th Cir.
1996). For a more skeptical view of the application of the “similarly situated” requirement to the credit context, see Judge Posner in Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1998). In general, the notion of “similarly situated” has been somewhat controversial over the years, including in the context of
employment discrimination. For further discussion, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) (discussing problems that arise
from the judiciary’s dependence on “comparators” in evaluating discrimination
claims); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831 (2002).
275. According to the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, even the prima
facie case of the plaintiff cannot rely only on a showing of disparities. Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 541 (2015) (“In a
similar vein, a disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if
the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.”).
276. Despite the role outcome analysis plays in a disparate impact case, particularly in the prima facie case of a claimant or plaintiff, there is little guidance on how
exactly to conduct this analysis. See discussion in Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated,
GEO. MASON L. REV. 581, 583 (2011) (“Although the phrase ‘similarly situated’ is a familiar component of equal protection case law, it has not received much scholarly
attention. Constitutional law scholars have focused more on other aspects of the doctrine.”). For an example of what outcome analysis might look like in a disparate impact case, see the expert opinion discussed in Ayres et al., supra note 102, at 235–39.
The effect of race was considered by using a regression with various controls—
although the paper does not directly discuss which controls are appropriate to include. Id. at 236–39.
There is some ambiguity over whether the requirement to demonstrate that a
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A new interpretation to this old question can be used as an outcome-based test in the algorithmic setting. In a world in which there
is no credible way to determine at the outset whether a protected
characteristic is being used to price, the closest alternative would be
to ask: are the prices different for protected groups, controlling for
the legitimate grounds for differentiation? In a sense, this question
reverse engineers the basic classification question of whether borrowers are distinguished based on the protected characteristic.277
Only the unexplained component of price disparity would then be
the basis of discrimination and not the raw disparities alone.
In the algorithmic context, we can consider a set of characteristics which determines who is similarly situated. Any differences that
are explained by this set of characteristics are not deemed to be impermissible discrimination.278 This set can be intuitively understood
as adding control variables into a regression in that they explain differences between people.279 The size and scope of the similarly situated set are likely to have a significant effect on whether there is a
finding of impermissible disparity.280 As this set expands, more of the

member of a protected group was treated differently to someone “similarly situated”
is part of the first or third stage of the burden-shifting framework. See Goldberg, supra note 274, at 746–47 (discussing how circuits differ on this issue); see also
Schwemm, supra note 274, at 328–31 (describing the utility of finding a similarly situated individual for proving intentional discrimination in mortgage discrimination
cases using the burden-shifting framework). Furthermore, it is unclear whether the
requirement is part of a disparate treatment case as well as a disparate impact case.
See Goldberg, supra note 274, at 731–33 (outlining the confusion of the comparator
analysis).
277. See Goldberg, supra note 274, at 731 (“[E]valuating allegations of discrimination requires courts and others to see something that is not observable directly:
whether an accused discriminator has acted because of a protected characteristic.”).
278. There are some similarities between my framework and the framework
proposed by Dwork et al. See supra note 58. Their approach is based on a similarity
metric between individuals who are treated fairly if the classifier ensures similar outcomes for similar individuals. Id. at 214.
279. This is similar to the analysis discussed in Ayres et al. See supra note 102.
The expert report discussed in that paper presented different linear regression models, which included different variables as controls to consider whether there was still
a significant coefficient on “race” after adding the controls. Id. at 235–39. A recent
paper suggests that controlling for covariates may produce skewed results and proposes a method to correct for omitted variable bias. See Jongbin Jung, Sam CorbettDavis, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, Omitted and Included Variable Bias in Tests for Disparate Impact, ARXIV, Aug. 30, 2019, at 2 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.05651
[https://perma.cc/57U7-LD3J], (introducing the authors’ “risk-adjusted regression”
method).
280. See Goldberg, supra note 274, at 756–57 (noting courts’ concerns with small
sample sizes when evaluating comparators in discrimination cases).
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raw differences are accounted for by the preexisting differences of
protected groups.
It is important to note that who is similarly situated is essentially a normative question and not an empirical one, as it reflects who
we believe should be treated similarly.281 The difference between the
empirical question of who is the same versus who should be treated
the same becomes particularly apparent when we consider that fair
lending law prohibits discrimination based on protected characteristics, even if they are directly related to default.282 As discussed above,
age and marital status may change a borrower’s default risk, yet
these characteristics cannot be used to distinguish between people.283
Testing for disparities among the “similarly situated” may seem
like a return to input-based approaches, as it relies on the selection
of the legitimate bases for differentiation.284 If the test requires selecting normatively relevant criteria for distinction, then it may look
similar to restricting an algorithm to pre-approved inputs.285 However, this test differs from the input-based approaches that I criticized in Part III.286 That is because restricting an algorithm’s inputs
to the similarly situated set would, while sufficient, not be necessary
for this test. After all, there may be many inputs that increase prediction accuracy while not creating significant disparities.287 This is especially important in the case of characteristics that would help increase access to credit for protected groups but are unlikely to be
included in the similarly situated set, such as timely rental payments.288 Moreover, a regulator may set the tolerance level such that
some disparity is permissible when using inputs beyond the “similarly situated” set.
281. Note that the similarly situated set is separate from the set of characteristics
that is predictive of the outcome. See generally Ayres et al., supra note 102, at 235–39
(outlining the methodology of an expert witness in disparate impact lending litigation). If all the characteristics that are predictive of an outcome were included in the
similarly situated set, then, by definition, the algorithmic credit pricing does not create impermissible disparity. Adopting such a definition of the similarly situated test
puts us back into the world in which once the protected characteristic is excluded,
discrimination law is no longer relevant. See discussion supra Part III.
282. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
284. See discussion supra Part I.C.
285. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
286. See discussion supra Part III.
287. See Xiang, supra note 207, at 23 (“[I]ncluding [protected class variables] can
actually improve both fairness and accuracy, depending on how they are used.”).
288. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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In general, creating a test that relies on similarly situated characteristics makes the tradeoff between accuracy and other policy
goals explicit, rather than rendering it opaque as input-based approaches do when they restrict inputs to those that seem intuitively
relevant to default.289 It also means that this set can be adjusted and
tested, whereas the restrictions of input-based approaches are not
legible and adaptable.290 The one disadvantage of this approach,
however, is its reliance on a normatively determined set, which may
be problematic—particularly if the set includes characteristics that
may themselves be the source of disadvantage, such as credit
scores.291
2. Considering Incremental Change
Another meaningful way to consider the disparities created by
algorithmic pricing is to do so relative to a baseline, such as traditional credit pricing. Rather than considering the absolute levels of
disparities created by a pricing rule, as in Figure 12,292 the focus is on
how these disparities compare to traditional credit pricing rules.293
Similarly, a regulator could compare the prices produced under the
use of traditional lending variables with new data available to a
lender, such as consumer and payment behavior. In fact, the type of
analysis conducted throughout this paper, and particularly in Parts
II.C294 and III.C,295 would be the starting point to analyze the incremental effects of new technologies.
An incremental approach to disparities recognizes that credit is
priced in a “biased world” but also seeks to prevent algorithmic pricing from exacerbating preexisting disadvantage.296 When personalized pricing relies on biased inputs, it is unlikely to ever produce
289. See discussion supra Part I.A for an overview of how credit decisions are
made.
290. But see supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing some discretion
enjoyed by loan officers).
291. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
292. For an in-depth explanation of Figure 12, see discussion infra Appendix B.
293. See discussion supra Part I for an overview of traditional credit pricing.
294. The analysis in this Part looked at the way a new statistical technology can
increase disparities when relying on “biased world” inputs, and how the use of big
data can reduce disparities caused by “biased measurement.”
295. The analysis in this Part considered the tradeoff between accuracy and disparity.
296. See Berk et al., supra note 262, at 31 (“At the same time, the benchmark is
current practice. By that standard, even small steps, imperfect as they may be, can in
principle lead to meaningful improvements in criminal justice decisions. They just
need to be accurately characterized.”).
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pricing that is not disparate for protected groups.297 This type of test
is therefore more appropriate for the effect-based interpretation of
disparate impact,298 as it seeks to balance both the concern for further entrenching disadvantage with the interests of lenders and importance of functioning credit markets.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section II.C.2, the use of nontraditional datasets could in fact mitigate the harms of biased measurement, which would reduce disparities among groups. Accurate pricing could also expand access to credit, which could in turn benefit
vulnerable groups.299 The conclusion is that there is a need for an
empirical test for determining whether there is harm to protected
groups stemming from changes in credit pricing rather than from the
general use of biased inputs in credit decisions. This approach therefore avoids holding algorithms to a standard that is far harsher than
current standards of fair lending are, which may end up overlooking
the potential of algorithmic pricing to help consumers.
This type of incremental analysis is suggested by a recent update published by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
The background for this update is a “No-Action Letter” that the CFPB
sent to an algorithmic lender, Upstart, in 2017 and later extended in
2020.300 In its update on the No-Action Letter on August 6, 2019, the
CFPB reported results from Upstart’s analysis “comparing outcomes
from its underwriting and pricing model (tested model) against outcomes from a hypothetical model that uses traditional application
and credit file variables and does not employ machine learning (traditional model).”301 The focus of Upstart’s analysis was therefore the
297. See discussion supra Part I.B.
298. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
300. Letter from Christopher M. D’Angelo, Assoc. Dir. For Supervision, Enf’t & Fair
Lending, CFPB, to Thomas P. Brown, Paul Hastings, LLP (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action
-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC79-TYMY] [hereinafter 2017 No-Action Letter]; Letter from Edward Blatnik, Acting Assistant Dir., Off. of Innovation, CFPB, to Alison
Nicoll,
Gen.
Couns.,
Upstart
Network,
Inc.
(Nov.
30,
2020),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_upstart-network-inc_noaction-letter_2020-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NSP-4T6V] [hereinafter CFPB 2020
No-Action Letter]. The 2017 No-Action Letter was the first and only No-Action letter
that the CFPB had provided. See Ficklin & Watkins, supra note 177. For the general
policy, see Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, 81 Fed. Reg. 8,686
(Feb. 22, 2016).
301. Ficklin & Watkins, supra note 177; see also Patrice Ficklin, Tom Pahl & Paul
Watkins, Innovation Spotlight: Providing Adverse Action Notices When Using AI/ML
Models, CFPB (July 7, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/
innovation-spotlight-providing-adverse-action-notices-when-using-ai-ml-models
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incremental change in moving from traditional credit pricing to algorithmic credit pricing. It is this type of analysis that should form the
core of fair lending analysis.
In its most recent No-Action letter to Upstart, the CFPB provided
further details on the type of testing Upstart is required to perform.302 The letter creates a framework for the periodic reporting,
which it calls the Model Risk Assessment Plan (MRAP). Under MRAP,
Upstart is required to report on the predictive accuracy by group and
to test how its model compares to other credit models in enabling
access to credit.303
An incremental approach could use an evolving baseline, allowing gradual progress towards reducing disparities. Using the status
quo as the baseline is useful when considering whether to allow the
initial use of a new technology but runs the risk of setting a low bar
for fintech lenders in the long run. Therefore, as consumer lending
moves beyond traditional credit pricing, there is a need to set a new
bar of what is expected from lenders that use advance prediction
technologies and new data.
In summary, outcome-based testing could provide important information about two questions that are meaningful to discrimination
analysis: whether similarly situated borrowers are treated the same
and whether a change in pricing increases or decreases disparity,
which are highly relevant both under “credit discrimination as classification” and “credit discrimination as discriminatory effects.”304
B. REGTECH RESPONSE TO FINTECH
Regulators need to develop tools that will allow them to respond effectively to changes in the credit pricing world. Credit pricing is becoming more complex, with respect to both the decision inputs and how those inputs are used to produce predictions and
pricing rules.305 This environment is becoming increasingly difficult
to oversee, as regulators need to supervise an evolving technological
environment. Past regulatory focus on analyzing inputs was to a
large extent feasible because of the limited complexity of credit pricing decisions.306
[https://perma.cc/2BJE-8E7D] (commenting on AI’s ability to comport with existing
regulations).
302. CFPB 2020 No-Action Letter, supra note 300, at 3.
303. Id. at 3.
304. See discussion supra Part I.C.
305. See discussion supra Part II.A.
306. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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The move to a more technologically complex environment can
create important opportunities for regulators. This is underappreciated by many scholars who focus solely on the challenges for regulators in gaining competency in new domains. Machine learning pricing introduces new transparency and can therefore lead to new
regulatory tools. In the case of credit pricing, the greatest change is
that much is known about credit pricing even before a pricing rule is
applied to new borrowers.307 In the traditional credit pricing context,
regulators respond to materialized prices, meaning actual prices
charged to actual borrowers.308
It is notable that the EU proposed regulation of AI from April
2021, which provides a comprehensive framework for the regulation
of AI across many domains,309 adopts a model of ongoing testing and
reporting. The proposal requires system developers to engage in exante and ongoing testing of algorithms, the results of which are reported to the relevant national supervisory authorities, depending
on the domain in which the AI is deployed.310 The proposal, which
designates creditworthiness assessments as a use of AI that is “highrisk”311 and therefore subject to heightened regulation, requires developers of AI systems to lay down risk management systems that
test the system prior to placement of the product on the market,312
as well as post-market monitoring.313 The proposal also requires the
monitoring of bias and its detection and correction, explicitly allowing the use of protected characteristics in this process.314 Importantly, the proposal requires developers to create a conformity assessment, reported to the regulator, in order to certify that they have met
the requirements of the proposal.315
In the machine learning pricing context, regulators themselves
can analyze pricing rules before they are applied to real borrowers,
similar to the simulations throughout this paper, creating the poten307. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 5, at 160–61 (noting machine learning’s
ability to detect patterns to predict future data).
308. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
309. European Union Proposal, supra note 17, at 21.
310. Id at 49. (“[National supervisory authorities must comply with the requirements in Chapter 2 and] provide national competent authorities and notified bodies
with all the necessary information to assess the compliance of the AI system with
those requirements.”).
311. Id. at 27 and Annex III (containing the full list of high-risk uses).
312. Id. at 46–48.
313. Id. at 74–75.
314. Id. at 48.
315. Id. at 58–59.
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tial for ex ante testing. As argued throughout this Article, the effects
of changes in credit markets on disparities between groups is unclear and cannot be adequately studied from a theoretical perspective. This means that only testing can provide information on the actual effects of pricing rules.
This approach also provides more certainty to lenders. Lenders
that wish to depart from traditional credit pricing currently face a
very uncertain regulatory landscape. They are unsure about how to
comply with discrimination law in a machine learning setting. The
outcomes-based testing approach that I propose would provide
lenders with valuable legal certainty.
CONCLUSION
Risk-based pricing is about differentiating borrowers. Big data
and machine learning enhance the ability to differentiate, increasing
the tension with fair lending law that limits differentiation of borrowers on protected grounds. Traditional fair lending law has sought
to constrain pricing practices by scrutinizing inputs. This approach
was developed in a world in which pricing relied on few inputs, depended on human expertise, and used loan officers to set the final
terms of credit contracts. Modern underwriting is increasingly relying on nontraditional inputs and advanced prediction technologies,
challenging existing discrimination doctrine.
Legislators and regulators face a difficult puzzle in crafting regulation that retains the benefits of algorithmic credit pricing while
limiting its potential to hurt protected groups. In May 2019, the
House Financial Services Committee established the Task Force on
Financial Technology to “examine the current legal framework for
fintech, how fintech is used in lending and how consumers engage
with fintech,” along with a second task force on artificial intelligence.316 The CFPB, in its July 2019 fair lending report, highlighted
the Bureau’s interest in “ways that alternative data and modeling
may expand access to credit” while also seeking to understand the
risks of these models.317 The CFPB announcement from August 6,
2019, endorsed the view that big data and machine learning lenders
could comply with fair lending if they demonstrate that their lending
316. Committee Passes Bills to Promote Innovation, Strengthen the Financial System and Protect Consumers, Small Businesses and Investors, U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON FIN.
SERVS. (May 9, 2019), https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle
.aspx?DocumentID=403739 [https://perma.cc/6QLM-PAF3].
317. Fair Lending Report of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, June
2019, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,420, 32,422–23 (July 8, 2019).
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practices do not increase disparities.318 Additionally, the recent Request for Information on the use of AI in finance—emphasizing the
use of AI in credit—reflects the coordinated and increased interest in
creating a regulatory regime for AI lending.319 These regulatory efforts indicate that fair lending is likely to be a central battleground
on which the boundaries of algorithmic fairness and discrimination
will be fought.
My aim in this Article has been to show that currently favored
approaches to resolving the tension between old law and new realities are not promising. Current approaches are inadequate because
they continue to commit the input fallacy, even though scrutinizing
decision inputs as in traditional fair lending is no longer feasible or
effective in the algorithmic context. This input fallacy is committed
by both proponents and opponents of a broad disparate impact
standard. Algorithmic decision-making, however, requires a fundamental shift away from analysis that seeks to reveal causal connections between inputs and outcomes.
I propose that fair lending shift its gaze downstream to the outputs of an algorithm. Regulators should develop tests for considering
when the outcomes an algorithm creates are impermissible based on
regulatory policy goals. Regulators should begin by asking meaningful questions that can be answered by examining algorithmic outcomes, such as whether similarly situated borrowers are treated differently or whether the move from traditional pricing to algorithmic
pricing has increased disparities. This type of test is particularly important when it is impossible to determine at the outset whether a
change in prediction technology or input variables will increase or
decrease disparities. An empirically driven and experimental approach allows regulators to respond to the unique discrimination
challenges posed by the fintech industry and to leverage technological advancement for the sake of greater fairness in lending.
But the conclusions go beyond credit pricing. They apply to all
domains in which scholars and lawmakers are struggling to apply
discrimination law to the algorithmic setting, such as criminal justice
and employment. It is time for discrimination law to leave behind the
input fallacy, recognize the new challenges of algorithmic decisionmaking, and embrace its opportunities.

318. Ficklin & Watkins, supra note 177 (noting that innovations like machine
learning may expand access to credit).
319. Request for Information and Comment on Financial Institutions’ Use of Artificial Intelligence, Including Machine Learning, 86 Fed. Reg. 16,837 (March 31, 2021).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: SIMULATION DATA320
As discussed in the main Article, I demonstrate my main points
in a stylized simulation exercise that is calibrated to real data.321
Specifically, I consider a lender who prices mortgages based on an
algorithmic prediction of their default risk, in order to consider the
implications of using biased inputs in the algorithmic setting and to
evaluate leading approaches to the application of discrimination law
to algorithmic decision-making. I also use the simulation exercise to
present my proposed regulatory framework.
The simulation demonstration is based on real mortgage application data from the Boston Fed HMDA dataset. In general, the
HMDA requires mortgage lenders to disclose loan-level information
on mortgage applications and whether they were granted or denied.322 A modified version of HMDA data is publicly available and
includes basic data on the loan and the applicant, including demographic information such as race.323 I specifically use the Boston Fed
HMDA dataset,324 which is based on a follow-up survey conducted by
the Boston Fed to supplement the data in HMDA on loans made in
1990 with additional information on financial, employment, and
property characteristics.325
Despite the dataset’s being nearly 30 years old, it is a uniquely
rich dataset and therefore useful to consider a lender using machine
learning predictions to set loan prices. The dataset contains information on the finances of the borrower, such as total debt-to-income
ratio, the applicant’s credit and borrowing history, whether the applicant is self-employed, and whether the borrower was denied private mortgage insurance. The dataset also contains information on
the loan, such as whether the property is a multi-family home,
whether the loan has a fixed interest rate, and the term of the loan.326
320. The following is adapted from a previous publication that I co-authored. See
Gillis & Spiess, supra note 36.
321. See discussion supra Part II.B.
322. See Munnell, et al., supra note 77, at 25 (mentioning data points collected
because of the HMDA).
323. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
324. See Munnell et al., supra note 77, at 25–28 (describing how the Boston Fed
created this unique dataset and a discussion of their findings).
325. HMDA data do not contain information about credit histories, debt burdens,
or loan-to-value ratios among other factors. Id. at 25. The Boston Fed also used census data on neighborhood characteristics. Id. at 26.
326. Id. at 13–14, 32.
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The most significant advantage of using HMDA data is that they contain demographic characteristics, such as borrower race, gender, age,
and marital status along with various neighborhood characteristics.327 The lender can be considered a “big data” lender because this
type of lender uses many variables (around 40) relative to the number of observations (around 3,000). Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this lender does not include many of the types of the nontraditional variables discussed in Subsection II.A.1; however, the types
of variables are broader than what is typically used by mortgage
originators in setting the “par-rate” in traditional lending.328
The Boston Fed HMDA dataset only contains information available at the time of the loan application and therefore does not contain information on the performance of the loan, such as whether a
borrower defaulted on the loan. Based on the HMDA data alone, one
could not run a default prediction exercise because the training data
needs to contain labels, meaning the outcome that the machine
learning algorithm is trained to predict. To overcome this difficulty
for the purposes of this exercise, I construct a model based on the dataset that links rejection approval rates to loan default.329
From this dataset, a simulation model relates applicant and
mortgage characteristics to the probability of default. Because mortgage defaults are not observed in this dataset, but are an essential
aspect of the simulation demonstration, the default probabilities
from loan approvals can be imputed and calibrated to overall default
rates. As an important restriction of the analysis, I cannot make any
statements about actual defaults in this data but rather demonstrate
methodological points under this hypothesized model of default.
Specifically, a ridge-penalized logistic regression model330 of
loan approval is fitted on approximately fifty characteristics of the
loan and the borrower (including demographics, geographic information, and credit history), excluding race and ethnicity, which is
then recalibrated such that the default rate among those approved
for the loan matches the rate reported in a recent paper that uses the

id.

327. Such as the appreciation of housing properties in the neighborhood. Id.
328. For a full description of the variables in the Boston Fed HMDA dataset, see

329. The methodology is similar to that discussed in the Online Appendix in Gillis
& Spiess, supra note 36. Further details are provided in Appendix A.
330. TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE AND PREDICTION 119–29 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing logistic regression).
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matched HMDA-McDash dataset.331 As a result, for every individual
in the Boston Fed HMDA dataset, a probability of default is obtained.
The samples are drawn from the simulation population as follows. First, a bootstrap sample is drawn, without replacement, from
the full Boston Fed HMDA dataset. Second, for every individual in the
bootstrap sample, that individual’s default is simulated based on the
default probability implied by the calibrated simulation model. As a
result, default indicators along with individual characteristics for
each individual in the sample are obtained.
In the simulation demonstration, the firm constructs a prediction of default based on a training sample of two thousand consumers drawn randomly. The firm utilizes a machine-learning algorithm
that uses these data to produce a prediction function that relates
available consumer characteristics (potentially including race) to the
predicted probability of default. The properties of a given prediction
rule on a new sample of two thousand consumers is then assessed.
As an example of an algorithm that produces such a prediction
rule, the firm could run a simple logistic regression in their training
sample that produces a prediction function of the form:
predicted probability of default = logistic(α + β! characteristic! + β" characteristic" + . . . )

where the characteristics could be the applicant’s income or credit
score. While the machine-learning algorithms considered in this Article also produce functions that relate characteristics to the probability of default, they typically take more complex forms that allow,
among other things, for interactions between two or more characteristics to affect the predicted probability and are thus better suited to
represent richer, possibly nonlinear relationships between characteristics and default. Some of these algorithms build on top of another simple prediction function, namely a decision (or regression) tree.
The decision tree decides at every node, based on the value of one of
the characteristics, whether to go left or right (for example, if income
is below some threshold, go left, otherwise right), before arriving at a
terminal node that returns a prediction of the probability of default
of all individuals with the relevant characteristics. An example of a
decision tree is given in Figure 10. Using this decision tree, the firm
would predict that an individual who obtained mortgage insurance
(top level, go left) but has a debt-to-income ratio of above 75% will
have an 80% probability of default.
331. See Fuster et al., supra note 65, (manuscript at 12) (explaining the use of
both the HMDA and McDash datasets).
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Figure 10: A decision tree that predicts default probability on
simulated data

In order to analyze default predictions by group—for which the
primary focus is on racial/ethnic groups in the simulation demonstration—I consider their distribution in the new (“holdout”) sample
of two thousand consumers drawn from the population. For most of
the Article, I use a rule obtained from a random forest machinelearning algorithm, which is a collection of many decision trees that
are averaged.
APPENDIX B: UNDERSTANDING ROC CURVES
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a way of
capturing prediction accuracy by focusing on the binary classification of borrowers. The algorithm used in the Article produces the default risk for each borrower. The predicted default risk can then be
used by the lender to determine whether they believe a borrower is
likely to default or not. For example, a lender can determine a cutoff
of 30% default risk, so that all borrowers with a risk above 30% are
deemed “defaulters” and all those below are “non-defaulters.”
This cutoff will naturally produce some errors. There will be a
group of borrowers who were classified as “defaulters” but end up
repaying the loan and not defaulting (type I error).332 Conversely,
there will be a group of borrowers that were classified as “nondefaulters” that end up defaulting (type II error). There is a tradeoff
between the size of each of these error groups and minimizing the
size of one group will increase the size of the other group. For example, raising the cutoff to 60% will decrease the type I error and in-

332. In reality, this is often not observed. This is because the outcome of a loan is
only known if an applicant actually receives a loan. I therefore treat these examples
as the error rates that are observed in the holdout set.
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crease the type II error. The more accurate a prediction, the smaller
the tradeoff between these two types of errors.
The ROC curve captures the intuition that a more accurate prediction requires less of a tradeoff between different types of errors.
On the one hand, it considers the True Positive Rate (TPR), which is
the number of people who were correctly classified as “positive” relative to the total number of people classified as “positive”:
TPR =

True Positive
All Positive

In our case a “positive” event is when a borrower defaults on the
loan, so that the “true positive” is all the borrowers that the algorithm predicted would default on their loan and that did indeed default. On the other hand, the ROC curve considers the False Positive
Rate (FPR), which is the number of people falsely classified as “positive” relative to the total number of people classified as “positive”:
FPR =

False Positive
All Positive

The ROC curve plots the TPR for every level of FPR. It therefore
can be considered as a measure of the accuracy of the prediction. The
closer the curve is to the top left corner, the more accurate the prediction. When the curve lies on the diagonal 45º line, it means that
the prediction contains no information beyond random assignment.
Figure 11 shows the ROC curve for the risk prediction function
that was produced using all variables other than race. The ROC curve
is plotted separately for white and non-white borrowers. Figure 11
shows that the prediction for white borrowers is more accurate for
nearly every classification cutoff.
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Figure 11: ROC curve for risk prediction using all inputs (other than race),
plotted separately for whites (W) and non-whites (M) borrowers.

One common metric used to measure the prediction accuracy is
the Area Under Curve (AUC). The AUC is a number from 0.5 (perfectly random prediction) to 1 (perfectly predictive). When comparing
two prediction functions, the AUC is a useful metric to describe overall relative accuracy.
Another example is Figure 12, which plots the ROC curve for the
prediction of “marital status” from other HMDA dataset variables.
Figure 12 shows that a borrower’s marital status can be predicted
fairly accurately using the other HMDA variables.

Figure 12: ROC curve for prediction of “marital status.” The “marital status”
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is married and 0 if
the applicant is unmarried or separated in the Boston Fed HMDA dataset.
The ROC curve plots the true-positive-rate and false-negative-rate for different cut-off rules. The number in the lower right corner is the
Area Under Curve (AUC).

